Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review
Volume 47
Number 1 Fall 2013

Article 2

5-22-2014

Eagles, Indian Tribes, and the Free Exercise of Religion
Kathryn E. Kovacs

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr

Recommended Citation
Kathryn E. Kovacs, Eagles, Indian Tribes, and the Free Exercise of Religion, 47 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 53 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol47/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola
Marymount University and Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.

EAGLES, INDIAN TRIBES, AND THE FREE
EXERCISE OF RELIGION
Kathryn E. Kovacs∗
The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act prohibits the taking
or possession of eagles and eagle parts. Recognizing the centrality of
eagles in many Native American religions, Congress carved out an
exception to that prohibition for “the religious purposes of Indian
tribes.” The problems with the administration of that exception are
reaching crisis proportions. At the Fish and Wildlife Service’s
National Eagle Repository, which collects dead eagles from around
the country and distributes them to members of federally recognized
Indian tribes, more than six thousand tribal members are on a
waiting list for eagles. That list grows each year. Frustration with
the current system feeds a burgeoning black market that threatens
the viability of eagle populations. Neither of the Eagle Act’s goals is
being met: eagles are not adequately protected, and tribal religious
needs are not satisfied.
Scholarship in this area has neither fully elucidated the crosscutting tensions in the administration of the Eagle Act nor prescribed
a realistic solution. This Article fills that gap. First, the Article
examines a series of tensions: between species preservation and
religious freedom; between accommodating the religious needs of
tribal members and not accommodating others with the same
religious needs; within the case law itself; and between the
government’s effort to accommodate tribal religion and the deep
∗ Assistant Professor, Rutgers School of Law-Camden. The author represented the United
States on appeal in many of the cases discussed herein. The views expressed in this Article are
those of the author and are not intended to represent the views of the United States. Thanks to
Hope Babcock, Benjamin Barton, Lisa Bressman, Kristen Carpenter, Chris Chaney, Perry Dane,
Katie Eyer, Jean Galbraith, Jared Goldstein, Leslie Griffin, Michael McConnell, Gary Simson,
Jay Wexler, as well as participants in the Junior Environmental Law Professor Workshop at
American University (Brigham Daniels, Amanda Leiter, Jessica Owley, Michael Pappas, Justin
Pidot, and Noah Sachs); the New Scholars Workshop at the Southeast Association of Law
Schools Annual Conference; the Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship at Vermont Law
School; the Mid-Atlantic Law and Society Association Conference at the Earle Mack School of
Law at Drexel University; and the New Voices in Administrative Law Program at the Association
of American Law Schools Annual Meeting for helpful comments on drafts of this Article. I also
owe a great debt of gratitude to Elinor Colbourn.
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dissatisfaction of the tribal community. This Article then proposes a
solution: changing the Fish and Wildlife Service’s administration of
the exception from permitting individuals to permitting tribes and
ultimately turning over much of the administration of the Indian
tribes exception to the tribes acting collectively. The Article explains
how scholarship on indigenous cultural property, community
property solutions to the tragedy of the commons, and tribal selfdetermination supports this proposal. Finally, the Article shows how
this proposal will alleviate some of the tension in the administration
of the Eagle Act’s Indian tribes exception.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act1 (the “Eagle Act” or
“Act”) prohibits the taking or possession of eagles and eagle parts.
Its purpose is to protect eagles.2 But eagles play a critical role in
many Native American religions. They serve as a link between the
physical and spiritual worlds, and their parts are required for
religious ceremonies throughout the year and throughout one’s
lifetime.3 Congress recognized the eagle’s significance in Native
American religion and carved out an exception to the Eagle Act’s
prohibition for “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.”4 Under that
exception, the Fish and Wildlife Service’s National Eagle Repository
collects dead eagles from around the country and distributes them to
members of federally recognized Indian tribes.5
The problems with the administration of the Eagle Act’s “Indian
tribes” exception are reaching crisis proportions. The National Eagle
Repository—the only legal source for new eagles and feathers in the
United States—answers requests for a few feathers promptly. But
tribal members who need a whole eagle (to perform the annual Sun
Dance, for example) must wait years for their requests to be filled.6
More than six thousand members of federally recognized Indian
tribes are on the Repository’s waiting list for eagles.7 That list grows
each year. The wait for a whole golden eagle is now more than four
years.8 Frustration with the current system is feeding a burgeoning
black market that threatens the viability of eagle populations.9
Neither of the Eagle Act’s goals is being met: eagles are not
adequately protected, and tribal religious needs are not satisfied.10
The current administration of the Eagle Act is brimming with
tension, perhaps because it falls at the intersection of a number of
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

16 U.S.C. § 668 (2006).
United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
See infra Part III.A.
16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006).
See infra Part II.A.
See infra note 157.
See infra note 159.
See infra note 157.
See infra note 168.
See infra Part III.A.
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fundamental concerns: religious freedom, species protection, and
tribal sovereignty. The primary difficulty, as is true for many natural
resources, is scarcity. There simply is not a sufficient supply of
eagles to satisfy the religious demand while preserving the viability
of the species.11 To the extent that the demand for eagles grows out
of religious belief, the Eagle Act pits species protection against
religious freedom. One of the things that makes administering the
Eagle Act particularly difficult, however, is the exception from the
Act’s prohibition for “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.”12 The
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) implements that exception by
issuing permits both to take eagles and to possess eagles and eagle
parts to individual members of federally recognized Indian tribes.13
That exception adds a layer of inequality to the clash between
species preservation and religious freedom. It raises the question the
Supreme Court asked in Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente
União do Vegetal:14 If some people are exempted, why not others?15
There is also tension within the case law itself. In a number of
cases, individuals who are prosecuted for violating the Eagle Act’s
prohibition or who bring civil claims challenging that prohibition
contend that it violates their right to exercise their religion freely
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).16 The federal
courts of appeals disagree about the government’s evidentiary burden
in such cases and about which compelling interests the Eagle Act
furthers.17 In addition, the current regulatory structure is unwieldy
for the government and unsatisfying for the regulated community.18
The FWS currently is tasked with reviewing thousands of permit
applications each year and operating the National Eagle Repository
(the “Repository”).19 Although the staff does an admirable job
11. See infra Part III.A.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006).
13. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a) (2012).
14. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
15. Id. at 436.
16. See infra Part II.C. The Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the
states in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), but RFRA still applies to the federal
government. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a) (2006); see also United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d
1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding the RFRA can be applied to the federal government);
Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1067 n.10 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“RFRA
remains operative as to the federal government.”).
17. See infra Part III.C.
18. See infra Part III.A.
19. Id.
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administering this program, tribal members remain dissatisfied with
the application process, the wait to receive eagles from the
Repository, and the quality of items they receive from the
Repository.20 Finally, enforcing the Eagle Act’s prohibitions is too
big a job for the FWS’s limited staff.21 Obviously, administrative
change entails high transaction costs, but the current system is not
sustainable. Eagle populations are not keeping pace with growing
demand; tribal members are becoming increasingly frustrated with
the current system; and the black market is blossoming.
The many student notes22 and few scholarly articles23 on the
Eagle Act have not prescribed realistic solutions, much less fully
20. Id.
21. See infra Part III.D.
22. See Brett Anderson, Recognizing Substance: Adoptees and Affiliates of Native American
Tribes Claiming Free Exercise Rights, 7 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 61 (2001)
(arguing that tribes should be empowered to give eagle parts to nonmembers who are adopted by
or affiliated with the tribe); Tina S. Boradiansky, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing of
Federally Protected Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709, 754 (1990) (“[I]ndividual freedom to
seek religious gratification at the expense of another species may be an individual freedom which
we can no longer afford.”); James R. Dalton, Comment, There Is Nothing Light About Feathers:
Finding Form in the Jurisprudence of Native American Religious Exemptions, 2005 BYU L. REV.
1575 (2005) (advocating giving tribes greater autonomy in administering the Indian tribes
exception to the Eagle Act); Michael Davidson, United States v. Friday and the Future of Native
American Religious Challenges to the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 86 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1133 (2008) (discussing avenues left open for Native American religious challenges to the
Eagle Act after United States v. Friday); Amie Jamieson, Will Bald Eagles Remain Compelling
Enough to Validate the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act After ESA Delisting? The Ninth
Circuit’s Analysis in United States v. Antoine, 34 ENVTL. L. 929, 932 (2004) (arguing that courts
should not consider the bald eagle’s status under the Endangered Species Act when evaluating the
Eagle Act’s validity under RFRA); Stephen Rosecan, A Meaningful Presentation: Proposing a
Less Restrictive Way to Distribute Eagle Feathers, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 891, 893 (2008)
(advocating allowing tribal members to give feathers to nonmembers “who are actively involved
in Native American religious practices”); Francis X. Santangelo, A Proposal for the Equal
Protection of Non-Indians Practicing Native American Religions: Can the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act Finally Remove the Existing Deference Without a Difference?, 69 ST. JOHN’S L.
REV. 255 (1995) (arguing that religious practitioners who are not tribal members should have the
same access to eagles as tribal members and that RFRA will vindicate nonmembers’ claims).
23. See Antonia M. De Meo, Access to Eagles and Eagle Parts: Environmental Protection v.
Native American Free Exercise of Religion, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 771, 773 (1995)
(advocating restructuring the eagle permit process to allow tribes to distribute eagle parts);
Roberto Iraola, The Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 68 ALB. L. REV. 973 (2005)
(reviewing the Eagle Act’s civil and criminal penalty provisions); Matthew Perkins, The Federal
Indian Trust Doctrine and the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act: Could Application of the
Doctrine Alter the Outcome in U.S. v. Hugs?, 30 ENVTL. L. 701, 703, 711, 727 (2000)
(concluding that Indian trust doctrine provides the most viable means for tribal members to
challenge the Eagle Act); Kyle Persaud, A Permit to Practice Religion for Some but not for
Others: How the Federal Government Violates Religious Freedom When it Grants Eagle
Feathers Only to Indian Tribe Members, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 115, 115–16 (2010) (arguing that
denying individuals who are not tribal members, but who practice Native American religions,
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elucidated the cross-cutting tensions in the administration of the
Indian tribes exception.24 This Article fills that gap.25
I propose changing the FWS’s administration of the exception
from issuing permits to individuals to instead issuing permits to
tribes and ultimately turning over much of the administration of the
Indian tribes exception to the tribes themselves, acting collectively.26
Under the first phase of my proposal, the FWS would amend its
regulations to provide for the issuance of eagle take and possession
permits to tribes instead of tribal members. Tribes would then
allocate their share of eagles to their members. When a sufficient
number of tribes have developed the necessary governance structures
(with technical and financial support from the FWS), the tribes
acting collectively could be empowered to define the contours of the
Indian tribes exception, including perhaps defining who is entitled to
take and possess eagles and for what purposes; how they may be
obtained, transferred and disposed; and how the initial allocation of
permits should be changed. Not much can be done to alleviate the
baseline problem of an inadequate supply of a religiously significant
species; the Eagle Act will always reflect the clash between religious
freedom and species protection.27 The added inequality of the Indian
tribes exception and the burdens of the current regulatory system,
however, can be alleviated simply by changing the Act’s
administration.

access to eagle parts violates RFRA); Kevin J. Worthen, Eagle Feathers and Equality: Lessons
on Religious Exceptions from the Native American Experience, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 989, 993
(2005) (concluding that the preferential treatment of tribal members in the Eagle Act satisfies “the
requirements of both liberty and equality to an acceptable degree”).
24. Suggestions that Congress should amend the Eagle Act are impractical. See Dalton,
supra note 22, at 1578, 1617; De Meo, supra note 23, at 810–12. James Dalton also suggested
that tribes should be given greater authority under the Eagle Act, Dalton, supra note 22, at 1618–
21, but his comment did not provide a sufficient analytical foundation for his ideas or explore
their implications.
25. Legal scholars who write about Native American religion have focused more on sacred
sites than sacred animals. See, e.g., Kristen A. Carpenter, The Interests of “Peoples” in the
Cooperative Management of Sacred Sites, 42 TULSA L. REV. 37 (2006); Richard B. Collins,
Sacred Sites and Religious Freedom on Government Land, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 241 (2003);
Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural
Conflict over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 757
(2001).
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Parts III.A, IV.
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Although the problem of religious claims to eagles poses unique
challenges, scholarly work in other contexts supports my proposal.28
Kristen Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley developed a
theory of indigenous cultural property premised on the idea that
certain resources are integral to indigenous group identity and
therefore deserving of legal protection.29 Applying that framework
here entails recognizing that, because eagles are central to tribal
identity, that resource is a form of cultural property, and therefore
tribes should be empowered to participate in defining the contours of
the stewardship regime for eagles. Scholarship proposing community
property solutions to overexploitation of commons resources
suggests the same result.30 My proposal also goes part of the way
toward giving tribes the sort of meaningful self-determination that
Indian-law academics have urged in recent years.31
Although the differential treatment of tribal members and nonmembers with the same religious needs is both necessary and
justifiable,32 exempting tribes instead of tribal members would ease
the inequitable tension in the current administration of the Eagle Act.
As the plain language of the Indian tribes exception reveals,
Congress intended the exception to operate as an accommodation for
Indian tribes with whom the federal government has long interacted
as sovereigns. Implementing the exception consistent with its plain
language by issuing permits to tribes would transform what currently
looks like an individual religious exemption into the political
accommodation it was meant to be. The Eagle Act would no longer
favor certain individual religious practitioners over other individual
28. See infra Part IV.A.
29. Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal, and Angela R. Riley, In Defense of Property, 118
YALE L.J. 1022, 1028 (2009); see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, 27
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 313, 322–23 (2008).
30. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1–2 (James E. Alt & Douglass C. North eds., 1990);
Sheila R. Foster, Collective Action and the Urban Commons, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 62
(2011); Kristin N. Johnson, Things Falling Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap Commons,
82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 168 (2011); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth
of a Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 546–47 (2007).
31. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent
Nations” in the Twenty-First Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Reempowered, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 443, 446 (2005); Rebecca Tsosie, Reconceptualizing Tribal
Rights: Can Self-Determination Be Actualized Within the U.S. Constitutional Structure?, 15
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 923, 925 (2011); Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the
Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777 (2006).
32. See infra Part III.B.
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religious practitioners. Rather, it would respect the sovereignty of
tribes that enjoy a government-to-government relationship with the
United States.33
This suggested change in the administration of the Eagle Act
also would alleviate some of the burden the permit process currently
imposes on Indian religious practitioners, by empowering tribes to
devise administrative procedures for allocating eagles that are more
consonant with tribal members’ religious needs and sensitivities.
Any discomfort with the government evaluating the bona fides of
applicants’ religious beliefs or interpreting the tenets of applicants’
religions would be alleviated by turning those tasks over to tribal
governments.34
This change in practice might have salutary effects for the FWS
as well. Presumably, administering the permit system would be
easier if the number of potential applicants were only 566, not over
two million. In the process of preparing tribes to administer their
eagle permits, those tribes that do not currently have game
regulations or enforcement capacity could be encouraged to develop
them, and some of the enforcement burden could eventually shift to
the tribes.35
The logistics of implementing this proposal will be challenging
and require input from many stakeholders, particularly the tribes who
own the cultural property interest in eagles. At the first stage of my
proposal, the stakeholders would have to figure out, among other
things, how to allocate this limited resource initially; what to do with
individuals who are currently on the waiting list; and how to avoid
disadvantaging tribes that are less administratively organized. The
second stage of my proposal might be even more challenging in that
it would require the tribes acting collectively to reach a consensus on
what the contours of the Indian tribes exception should be.36
Why should the government take on this enormous task?
Because the current system is not sustainable long-term as it is
currently structured, for the government, for tribes, or for eagles.
Because, although the United States has no legal obligation to
accommodate tribal religion, it has a moral obligation. And because
33.
34.
35.
36.

See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
See infra Part IV.B.3.
See infra Part IV.C.
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the eagle problem is uniquely amenable to solution at the
administrative level. The United States should act voluntarily and
immediately to protect tribal interests in this resource that is so
central to tribal identity. Otherwise, the bald eagle may recover, but
tribal religions will become endangered.
This Article proceeds as follows. I describe the current
framework of the Eagle Act, including statutes, regulations, and case
law, in Part II. In Part III, I address the tensions in the current
administration of the Eagle Act, including scarcity and inequality,
which provide the stimulus for questioning the status quo. Finally,
Part IV examines my proposal for alleviating those tensions.
II. THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Eagle Act
After two false starts in the 1930s,37 President Roosevelt signed
the Act for the Protection of the Bald Eagle on June 8, 1940.38 The
preamble to the Act recited that the Continental Congress in 1782
had adopted the bald eagle as the national symbol, “the bald eagle is
no longer a mere bird of biological interest but a symbol of the
American ideals of freedom,”39 and it “is now threatened with
extinction.”40 The statute made it unlawful to “take, possess, sell,
purchase, barter, offer to sell, purchase or barter, transport, export or
import, at any time or in any manner, any bald eagle, commonly
known as the American eagle, alive or dead, or any part, nest, or egg
37. The Senate passed eagle protection bills in 1930 and 1935, both of which died in the
House. See 72 CONG. REC. 6612 (1930); 79 CONG. REC. 10061 (1935). The Eagle Act gained
sufficient support to pass in the House only after the federal courts’ view of the Commerce
Clause power over wildlife began to change. See, e.g., Cerritos Gun Club v. Hall, 96 F.2d 620
(9th Cir. 1938) (upholding a provision of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act that exceeded the terms
of the migratory bird treaties as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause); Cochrane v. United States, 92 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1937) (same).
38. Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (1940). At the time, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 40
Stat. 755 (1918) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–11 (2006)), did not protect raptors.
See Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection of Migratory
Birds, 39 Stat. 1702 (1916) (not including raptors among list of protected birds); Convention
Between the United States and Mexico for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game
Mammals, 50 Stat. 1311 (1936) (same).
39. Not surprisingly, given the backdrop of fascist belligerence in Europe, patriotism
permeated the hearings on the bill. See Protection of Bald Eagle: Hearing on H.R. 4832 Before
the H. Comm. on Agric., 76th Cong. 49, 75, 76–77, 79, 80 (1940) (statements of Rep. Charles
Russell Clason, Maud Phillips, President, Blue Cross Animal Relief, and Dr. T.S. Palmer,
President, District of Columbia Audubon Society).
40. Pub. L. No. 76-567, 54 Stat. 250 (preamble).
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thereof,” except as permitted by the Secretary of the Interior.41 The
term “take” broadly included “pursue, shoot, shoot at, wound, kill,
capture, trap, collect, or otherwise willfully molest or disturb.”42
Section 2 of the Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior, if he
determined it to be “compatible with the preservation of the bald
eagle as a species to permit the taking, possession, and transportation
of [bald eagles] for the scientific or exhibition purposes of public
museums, scientific societies, or zoological parks, or . . . for the
protection of wildlife or of agricultural or other interests in any
particular locality.”43
Because young golden eagles are very difficult to distinguish
from young bald eagles,44 and bald eagle populations continued to
suffer,45 Congress extended the statute’s prohibitions to golden
eagles in the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act of 1962.46 At the
suggestion of the Department of the Interior, however,47 Congress
recognized that “feathers of the golden eagle are important in
religious ceremonies of some tribes,”48 and carved out an exception
authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to permit the taking,
possession, and transportation of eagles and eagle parts for “the
religious purposes of Indian tribes.”49

41. Id. §§ 1, 2 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668a).
42. Id. § 4 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668c).
43. Id. § 2 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668a).
44. 107 CONG. REC. 10507–8 (1961) (statement of Sen. Yarborough) (explaining that
immature bald eagles “are so similar to the golden eagle that only trained ornithologists are said
to be able to distinguish the two species; therefore many bald eagles are taken by mistake”).
45. Id. at 10508.
46. Pub. L. No. 87-884, 76 Stat. 1246 (1962).
47. Miscellaneous Fish and Wildlife Legislation: Hearings before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the H. Committee on Merch. Marine and Fisheries, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1962) [hereinafter House Hearings 1962] (pointing out that the golden eagle
was “important in enabling many Indian tribes, particularly those in the Southwest, to continue
ancient customs and ceremonies that are of deep religious or emotional significance to them”).
48. H.R. REP. NO. 87-1450, at 2 (1962) (recognizing the importance of golden eagle feathers
“in religious ceremonies of some Indian tribes”); see also S. REP. NO. 87-1986, at 3–4 (1962)
(noting that golden eagle feathers “are an important part of Indian religious rituals”); 108 CONG.
REC. 22270 (1962) (remarks of Sen. Keating) (stating that the golden eagle “is of religious
significance to many Indian tribes in America today”). The House report also noted that Indian
religious use of eagles resulted in the killing of “a large number of the birds” and that “if steps are
not taken . . . there is grave danger that the golden eagle will completely disappear.” H.R. REP.
NO. 87-1450, at 2.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 668a. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 740–43 (1986) (describing
legislative history of 1962 amendment).
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Under regulations implementing the Indian tribes exception,
only enrolled members of federally recognized Indian tribes with
which the United States maintains a government-to-government
relationship may apply for permits.50 When the Department of the
Interior first issued regulations implementing the Indian tribes
exception in 1963, it provided that “[a]pplications for permits to take
and possess bald eagles or golden eagles for the religious purposes of
Indian tribes must be submitted by individual Indians.”51 The 1974
amendments to the regulations required applicants to “attach a
certification from the Bureau of Indian Affairs that the applicant is
an Indian.”52 In 1999, Interior clarified that permits under the Indian
tribes exception are available only to members of federally
recognized Indian tribes.53 Instead of submitting a certification from
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the revised regulations require
applicants to attach a certification signed by an official of “an Indian
tribe that is federally recognized under the Federally Recognized
Tribal List Act of 1994, 25 U.S.C. 479a-1, 108 Stat. 4791 (1994).”54
The 1963 regulations provided that the Secretary could issue
permits only to “authentic, bona fide practitioners of [tribal]
religion.”55 The applicant was required to name the religious
ceremony in which the eagles would be used and “enclose a
statement from a duly authorized official of the religious group in
question verifying that the applicant [was] authorized to participate
in such ceremonies.”56 Interior deleted the latter requirement in 1999,
explaining that religious official certification was “largely
duplicative of the separate requirements of tribal membership
certification and the individual’s statement on the application form
itself, under penalty of perjury, of the individual’s religious need for
the permit.”57 The regulations still require applicants to identify the
tribal religious ceremony for which the eagles are needed,58 but the
application form states: “You may choose not to provide the name of

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a) (2012) (referencing 25 U.S.C. § 479a-1).
28 Fed. Reg. 976 (Feb. 1, 1963) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 11.6(d) (1967)).
39 Fed. Reg. 1158, 1184 (Jan. 4, 1974) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(5) (1975)).
64 Fed. Reg. 50,467, 50,473 (Sept. 17, 1999).
Id. (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(5) (2012)).
28 Fed. Reg. 976 (Feb. 1, 1963) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 11.5 (1967)).
Id. (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 11.6(d) (1967)).
64 Fed. Reg. 50,468, 50,473.
50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a)(4) (2012).
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the religious ceremony if doing so will violate your religious
beliefs.”59
Under the so-called Morton Policy, tribal members do not need
permits to possess dead eagles and eagle parts that they already own.
In a 1975 policy statement clarifying the Eagle Act’s enforcement,
Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton announced that
“American Indians” could, “without fear of Federal prosecution,
harassment, or other interference . . . possess, carry, use, wear, give,
loan, or exchange among other Indians, without compensation, all
federally protected birds, as well as their parts or feathers.”60 The
Attorney General, echoing the Morton Policy, recently clarified that
the federal government will not prosecute members of federally
recognized Indian tribes for possessing eagles or eagle parts or for
giving them to or exchanging them with other tribal members
without compensation.61 Therefore, applications for possession
permits are actually requests to obtain eagles or eagle parts from the
FWS. Applications for permits to possess eagle parts are processed at
the Service’s regional migratory-bird permit offices and, if approved,
are forwarded to the National Eagle Repository in Commerce City,
Colorado,62 the only legal source for new eagles and eagle parts63
59. Form 3-200-15A (rev. 2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-15a.pdf. The
application for take permits simply asks for the name of the applicant’s religion. Form 3-200-77
(rev. 2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-77.pdf.
60. News Release, Department of the Interior, Morton Issues Policy Statement on Indian
Use
of
Bird
Feathers
(Feb. 5,
1975),
available
at
http://www.fws.gov/news/historic/1975/19750205
.pdf. The Morton Policy also permitted “American Indians” to “transfer such feathers or parts to
tribal craftsmen without charge, but such craftsmen may be compensated for their work.” Id. The
Policy further clarified that Interior would continue to enforce statutory prohibitions against
“killing, buying or selling of eagles, migratory birds, or endangered species.” Id. The Eighth
Circuit upheld the Morton Policy against a claim that it discriminates on the basis of race in
United States v. Eagleboy, 200 F.3d 1137 (8th Cir. 1999), where the court reversed the dismissal
of a charge against a Native American who was not a member of a federally recognized Indian
tribe for possessing hawk parts in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.
61. Memorandum from the Attorney General to the Assistant Attorney General, Env. and
Natural Res. Div., All U.S. Attorneys, Director, Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys 3 (Oct. 12,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ef-policy.pdf. The Attorney General also reiterated
the Morton Policy’s commitment not to prosecute tribal members for giving eagle feathers to
craftspersons “to be fashioned into objects for eventual use in tribal religious or cultural
activities,” so long as no compensation is paid for the bird parts themselves. Id. And the Attorney
General clarified that tribal members would not be prosecuted for “[a]cquiring from the wild,
without compensation of any kind, naturally molted or fallen feathers,” id., though tribal
members must obtain a permit to salvage eagle carcasses or parts other than feathers. Id. at 7 n.9.
62. See Office of Law Enforcement, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/le
/national-eagle-repository.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2013).
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aside from tribally operated aviaries.64 The Repository receives dead
eagles and eagle parts and distributes them free of charge to qualified
permit applicants on a first-come, first-served basis.65 Because the
demand for eagle parts exceeds the supply, applicants must wait long
periods for their requests to be filled.66
Applicants for permits to take eagles must identify the species
and number of eagles or feathers proposed to be taken and the state
and local area where the taking is proposed.67 In processing
applications, the FWS considers “the direct or indirect effect which
issuing such a permit would be likely to have upon the wild
populations of bald or golden eagles.”68 When processing permits to
take eagles, the Service also considers whether the National Eagle
Repository can satisfy the applicant’s need.69
On April 29, 1994, “as part of an historic meeting with all
federally recognized tribal governments,” President Clinton signed
an executive memorandum that sought to facilitate the collection and
distribution of bald and golden eagles and their parts “[b]ecause of
the feathers’ significance to the Native American heritage and
consistent with due respect for the government-to-government
relationship between the Federal and Native American tribal
governments.”70 Accordingly, the President ordered the Department
of the Interior to “ensure the priority distribution of eagles, upon
permit application, first for traditional Native American religious
63. De Meo, supra note 23, at 788; Jay Wexler, Eagle Party, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 181, 182
(2011). The Eagle Act does not prohibit possession of bald eagles that were lawfully taken prior
to the enactment of the Bald Eagle Protection Act in 1940, or golden eagles that were lawfully
taken prior to the 1962 amendments. 16 U.S.C. § 668(a) (2006).
64. The FWS issues permits allowing tribes to operate aviaries. See Form 3-200-78 (rev.
2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/forms/3-200-78.pdf. As of June 2012, four tribes
operated eagle aviaries—the Zuni, Iowa, Comanche, and Navajo—and the Citizen Potawatomi
Nation was expected to open an aviary soon. Email from Eliza Savage, Regulatory Analyst, U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, to author (June 19, 2012, 10:45 a.m. EST) (on file with author). The
FWS is currently considering adopting a regulation that would add the bald and golden eagle to
the list of raptors that may be propagated in captivity. Migratory Bird Permits; Changes in the
Regulations Governing Raptor Propagation, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,367 (July 6, 2011).
65. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 944 (10th Cir. 2008); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERVICE, supra note 62; How Can I Obtain Eagle Feathers or Parts?, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERVICE, http://www.fws.gov/faq/featherfaq.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
66. See infra Part II.A.
67. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(a) (2012).
68. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22(c) (2012).
69. See Friday, 525 F.3d at 945.
70. Memorandum of Apr. 29, 1994: Policy Concerning Distribution of Eagle Feathers for
Native American Religious Purposes, 59 Fed. Reg. 22, 953 (May 4, 1994).
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purposes, to the extent permitted by law, and then to other uses.”71
The President also ordered the Interior Department to simplify the
permit process, minimize the delay in distributing eagles, and work
more closely with tribal governments.72 Consistent with that
directive, in Director’s Order No. 69, issued on March 30, 1994, the
Director of the FWS stated that “[b]ecause the demand always
exceeds the supply, eagles will not be donated or distributed for any
other purpose until the needs of Native Americans have been met.”73
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith,74 the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment allows the
application of neutral, generally applicable laws to religious
exercises even when the laws are not supported by a compelling
governmental interest.75 Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause did
not require Oregon to exempt from its criminal drug laws the
sacramental ingestion of peyote by members of the Native American
Church.76 Following Smith, Free Exercise Clause claims challenging
the Eagle Act for its burden on the exercise of religion would likely
fail.
Litigants may raise similar claims, however, under RFRA.
Congress enacted RFRA following Smith to codify, as a requirement
of federal statutory law, the Free Exercise Clause standard that the
Supreme Court applied before Smith in Sherbert v. Verner77 and
Wisconsin v. Yoder.78 RFRA allows the government to “substantially
burden a person’s exercise of religion” only if “it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person . . . (1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive
means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”79 Under
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, DIRECTOR’S
ORDER NO. 69 § 4.a (1994), available at http://www.fws.gov/policy/DO69.html.
74. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
75. Id. at 884–89.
76. Id. at 877–82.
77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
78. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); accord 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (2006); see also Gonzales v. O
Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (explaining that RFRA
codified “a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith”).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a)–(b) (2006).
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RFRA, the person contesting the government action must first prove
that the action substantially burdens a sincerely held religious
belief.80 When the plaintiff has met that threshold, the government
bears the burden on the compelling-interest and narrow-tailoring
elements of RFRA.81 The government, however, is not required to
“refute every conceivable option” to prove that a law is narrowly
tailored.82 Once the government provides evidence that an exemption
would impede the government’s compelling interests, the plaintiff
“must demonstrate what, if any, less restrictive means remain
unexplored.”83 RFRA provides a “workable test for striking sensible
balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental
interests.”84 The test must “be applied in an appropriately balanced
way, with particular sensitivity” to important governmental
interests,85 and “with regard to the relevant circumstances in each
case.”86
C. The Case Law
Individuals who are members of federally recognized Indian
tribes (tribal members) and individuals who are not members of
federally recognized Indian tribes (nonmembers) have raised RFRA
as a defense to eagle-related criminal charges and as the basis for
affirmative claims against the federal government. The cases fall into
three categories, and the courts have upheld the application of the
Eagle Act in all three.
The circuits are uniform in upholding the Eagle Act against
challenges by tribal members charged with taking eagles without a
permit.87 In United States v. Friday,88 for example, Winslow Friday,

80. Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1494–95 (10th Cir. 1996).
81. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b), 2000bb-2(3) (2006); O Centro, 546 U.S. at 428.
82. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1556 (8th Cir. 1996).
83. Id.; see also Fowler v. Crawford, 534 F.3d 931, 940 (8th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the
burden of proof shifted back to plaintiff after the government provided evidence that the
exemption would impede a compelling government interest).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2006).
85. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722 (2005) (addressing the identical standard under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act).
86. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9 (1993).
87. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 944 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Oliver,
255 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375 (9th Cir. 1997). Cf. United
States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming conviction of tribal member who
claimed treaty right to kill bald eagles); United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976)
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a member of the Northern Arapaho Tribe, shot an eagle for use in the
Sun Dance.89 Friday had not applied for a take permit from the
FWS.90 The government charged him with a misdemeanor violation
of the Eagle Act, and the district court granted Friday’s motion to
dismiss under RFRA.91 The Tenth Circuit reversed.92 Then-Judge
Michael McConnell, writing for the court, held that requiring Friday
to apply for a take permit before shooting an eagle did not
substantially burden his religion and that the permitting process is
narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s compelling interests.93
The circuits are also in accord in cases in which nonmembers,
appearing as criminal defendants or civil plaintiffs, allege that the
Eagle Act’s possession ban violates RFRA.94 In United States v.
Hardman,95 the Tenth Circuit consolidated for purposes of rehearing
en banc three cases involving eagle possession by nonmembers.96 In
the case involving Joseluis Saenz, the court recognized that the Eagle
Act serves compelling interests,97 but concluded that the United
States had failed to prove that the regulatory scheme furthers those
interests and affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Mr.
Saenz.98 Because the United States had not had an opportunity to
develop a record in the trial courts in the other two cases, against
Raymond Hardman and Samuel Ray Wilgus, the court remanded
those cases for consideration of the least restrictive means element of

(per curiam) (affirming conviction of tribal member who claimed Free Exercise Clause and treaty
right to sell eagle parts).
88. 525 F.3d 938 (10th Cir. 2008).
89. Id. at 945. Mr. Friday promised his grandmother on her deathbed that he would
participate in the Sun Dance. Eagle Case Belongs in Tribal Court, INDIANZ.COM (Oct. 7, 2009),
http://www.indianz.com/News/2009/016885.asp; Feds Need to Get Their Act Together on Eagle
Feathers, THE BUFFALO POST (Oct. 7, 2009, 9:08 AM), http://buffalopost.net/?p=3453.
90. Friday, 525 F.3d at 945.
91. Id. at 946.
92. Id. at 960.
93. Id. at 948.
94. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011); United States v. VasquezRamos, 531 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003)
(sale and possession charges); Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam)
(denial of possession permit application); see also Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding denial of application to possess eagle feathers filed
by nonmember Native American did not violate Free Exercise Clause).
95. 297 F.3d 1118 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1128–29.
98. Id. at 1132, 1136.
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the RFRA test.99 On remand, the district court dismissed the charges
against both Hardman and Wilgus.100 The United States did not
appeal in the Hardman case.101 But in United States v. Wilgus,102 the
Tenth Circuit reversed and joined the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in
holding that the Eagle Act satisfies RFRA.103
The federal government has also successfully rebutted RFRA
claims in criminal cases concerning the commercial trade in
eagles.104 In United States v. Antoine,105 for example, the defendant
claimed that prosecuting him for bartering eagle parts violated RFRA
because, for him, the exchange of eagle parts had religious
significance.106 The courts of appeals have not addressed head-on the
question of whether buying and selling eagles can be a bona fide
religious practice, but reject the RFRA claims for other reasons.107
Aside from the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Hardman, only two
courts have held against the government in Eagle Act cases involving
religion claims.108 Both cases concerned tribal members who killed
eagles without a permit. The district court in United States v.
Gonzales109 held that requiring an applicant for a permit to take an
eagle to identify the ceremony in which the eagle will be used, and
include a certification from a tribal elder that the applicant is
authorized to participate in that ceremony, violated RFRA.110 The
FWS no longer requires permit applicants to submit that
information.111 The court’s primary holding in United States v.
Abeyta112 was that the Eagle Act did not abrogate the defendant’s

99. Id. at 1131.
100. United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308 (D. Utah 2009).
101. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1281 n.4 (10th Cir. 2011).
102. 638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011).
103. Id. at 1295.
104. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 920 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Hugs, 109
F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997); cf. United States v. Top Sky, 547 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (holding Fort Bridger Treaty did not convey right to sell eagles).
105. 318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003).
106. Id. at 920.
107. But see Top Sky, 547 F.2d at 487–88 (holding that district court’s finding that
commercial trade in eagles does not have religious significance was not clearly erroneous).
108. See United States v. Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997); United States v.
Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986).
109. 957 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.M. 1997).
110. Id.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
112. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D.N.M. 1986).
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hunting rights under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.113 That
conclusion is no longer valid after the Supreme Court’s holding in
United States v. Dion114 that the Eagle Act did abrogate Indian treaty
hunting rights.115
III. THE TENSIONS
Despite the uniformity of outcomes in Eagle Act cases, there are
several reasons to consider changing the regulatory structure. Natural
resources statutes typically balance resource use and resource
preservation. Because the primary use for eagles is religious, the
Eagle Act must balance religious exercise against species
preservation. Unfortunately, the religious demand for eagles far
exceeds the supply.116 Tribal members wait for years to receive
eagles from the Repository, leading some turn to the black market to
fill their needs.117 Adding to the tension between species preservation
and religious exercise is the inequality of the Indian tribes exception.
Tribal members can obtain eagles for their religious purposes, but
individuals who are not tribal members cannot, even if their religious
need is indistinguishable.118 Moreover, tension persists within the
case law itself. The courts of appeals are split on the government’s
evidentiary burden in these cases, and they are all over the map on
which compelling interests the Indian tribes exception furthers.119
Finally, the tribal community is dissatisfied with the current
regulatory scheme.120 Those tensions are frustrating the purposes of
the Eagle Act and provide an impetus to reexamine the status quo.
A. Scarcity
The primary problem of natural-resource management is
scarcity.121 When the supply of a resource is unlimited, the resource
requires no management regime because there is plenty to go around.
When the supply is limited, however, and insufficient to meet the
113. Id.
114. 476 U.S. 734 (1986).
115. Id. at 745.
116. See infra Part III.A.
117. Id.
118. See infra Part III.B.
119. See infra Part III.C.
120. See infra Part III.D.
121. See Martin Nie, Governing the Tongass: National Forest Conflict and Political Decision
Making, 36 ENVTL. L. 385, 389 (2006).
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demand, natural resources law steps in to regulate the use of the
resource.122 Thus, natural resources statutes typically pit resource use
against resource preservation.123 The National Park Service Organic
Act is a classic example of this: it requires the Park Service “to
provide for the enjoyment” of the national parks, while
simultaneously conserving them and leaving them “unimpaired for
the enjoyment of future generations.”124
Cases raising religious claims under the Eagle Act are typical of
natural resources cases in that the primary problem is scarcity. There
simply are not enough eagles to satisfy the demand for dead eagles
while still preserving the viability of the species.125 If there were an
unlimited supply of eagles, there would be little need to give them
statutory protection. Some natural resources statutes are atypical,
however, in that one of the uses they must manage is religious use.126
The Eagle Act is the most noteworthy of those statutes, because it
expressly acknowledges and accommodates religious use of the
protected resource.127 The primary tension in cases raising religious
claims under the Eagle Act, then, is between eagle protection and
religious exercise.

122. See JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES
LAW AND POLICY 36 (2d ed. 2009); see also Sinden, supra note 30, at 534 (“The central question
of environmental policy is ‘how much?’”).
123. See generally Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Reiss, Recreation Wars for Our Natural
Resources, 34 ENVTL. L. 1091 (2004) (discussing the current era of natural resources regulation,
in which the law must reconcile the interests of preservationists with the interests of
recreationalists).
124. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); see Jay D. Wexler, Parks as Gyms? Recreational Paradigms and
Public Health in the National Parks, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 155, 160 (2004) (“As many have
observed, this ‘dual mandate’ sets up a difficult tension for the Service, which must balance
conservation with recreation to ensure that the parks can be enjoyed by current and future
generations without the sacrifice of natural resources.”).
125. See DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note 73
(stating that in implementing the Eagle Act and the Endangered Species Act, FWS needs to
recognize that the demand for dead eagle parts “always exceeds the supply”); Wexler, supra note
63, at 185 (asserting that demand for eagle parts has increased disproportionately because of the
public’s awareness regarding the Repository).
126. See Access Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding
Forest Service ban on rock climbing at site that has religious significance for an Indian tribe);
United States v. Adeyemo, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (regarding religious freedom
defense to charges of violating the Endangered Species Act by importing and possessing leopard
skins).
127. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006).
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Kristen Carpenter cautioned that “American Indian religious
practices are sensitive subjects.”128 The U.S. government long sought
“to eliminate ‘heathenish practices’” from tribal life and criminalized
many religious rituals.129 That history of religious persecution,
Carpenter pointed out, shapes any discussion of tribal religion.130
Moreover, there is great variety in Native American religion.131
Indeed, the Western concept of “religion” itself may not fit the
practices of many Native Americans for whom “religion is
inseparable from relationships and rituals, from stories and place.”132
With those cautions in mind, I will attempt to explain briefly the
importance of eagles in Native American religion.
Not all Native Americans require eagles for their religious
practices, and among those who do, the uses vary.133 One unifying
thread among those who require eagles is that the eagle is
“considered a sacred messenger to the spirit world.”134 For the Hopi,
for example, the golden eagle “serves as the link between the
spiritual world and the physical world . . . a connection that
128. Kristen A. Carpenter, Considering Individual Religious Freedoms Under Tribal
Constitutional Law, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561, 562 (2004) [hereinafter Carpenter, Religious
Freedoms]; see also Kristen A. Carpenter, Limiting Principles and Empowering Practices in
American Indian Religious Freedoms, 45 CONN. L. REV. 387, 396 (2012) [hereinafter Carpenter,
Limiting Principles] (describing how the law’s lack of context for unique Native American
religious practices has posed difficulties for Native American religious practitioners bringing free
exercise claims).
129. FELIX COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (2009); see also
William Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J.
1, 30–31 (2005) (outlining the Indian claim for redress based on federal suppression of Indian
religion); Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
Christianization Policy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 773, 787–805 (1997) (detailing federal suppression of Native American religion from 1882
to 1934).
130. Carpenter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 128, at 563.
131. Worthen, supra note 23, at 989–90 n.2. See Carpenter, Religious Freedoms, supra note
128, at 563; Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 403.
132. Carpenter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 128, at 562; see also DAVID GETCHES ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 727 (6th ed. 2011) (“The very dichotomy
suggested by the separate treatment of ‘religion’ and ‘culture’ reflects the inadequacies of the
dominant society’s categories in trying to accommodate Indian spiritual beliefs and value
systems. For most tribal Indians, culture is coterminous with religion, both terms encompassing
the spiritual dimension of a human being living in harmony with all persons and nature.”);
Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 397 (“In many American Indian communities,
the traditional Indian religion is at the root of the tribal culture, social structure, subsistence
practices, and even, in theocratic tribes, government.”).
133. Worthen, supra note 23, at 990 n.2.
134. De Meo, supra note 23, at 774; see also id. at 775 (“Eagles are, in essence, Native
American prayer messengers.”).
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embodies the very essence of Hopi spirituality and belief.”135 The
Hopi gather golden eaglets soon after birth, raise the fledglings, then
send the eagles “to their spiritual home” and use the eagles’ feathers
for various religious ceremonies. This annual process sustains “the
connection between the spiritual and physical worlds for the next
generation of Hopi.”136 Other Native American religions prohibit the
killing of eagles and only allow practitioners to collect molted
feathers or to pluck feathers from eagles without inhibiting their
ability to fly.137
Eagle feathers and parts are used in religious ceremonies
throughout the year and throughout one’s lifetime, including naming,
coming-of-age, marriage, burial, healing, and seasonal
ceremonies.138 For example, in the Northern Arapaho Tribe, the
annual Sun Dance, which was among those the federal government
outlawed in the late nineteenth century,139 requires the dance sponsor
to construct an offering lodge and acquire an eagle for use in the
dance as “a gift of the creator.”140 The eagle must be pure, meaning it
cannot have died from poisoning, disease, electrocution, or
automobile impact, and it cannot have been used in a prior Sun
Dance.141
The religious demand for eagles and eagle parts far exceeds the
Repository’s supply and the species’ viability.142 When the Eagle Act
was enacted in 1940, trophy hunting, poisoning by ranchers to
prevent livestock depredation, and habitat loss had reduced bald

135. Worthen, supra note 23, at 990 (quoting Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden
Eaglets from Waputki National Monument, 66 Fed. Reg. 6516, 6517 (proposed Jan. 22, 2001)).
136. Id. at 990 n.3 (quoting Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Eaglets from Waputki
National Monument, 66 Fed. Reg. 6516, 6517 (proposed Jan. 22, 2001)).
137. De Meo, supra note 23, at 775–76.
138. Id. at 776; Keith Coffman, Eagle Center Struggles to Supply American Indians Rituals,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 25, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-25/features/sns-rtus-usa-religion-eaglesbre83o19v-20120425_1_national-eagle-repository-bald-eagles-eaglecarcasses (quoting Hopi anthropologist Micah Loma’omvaya: “Eagles are integral to everything
we do. Not just for ceremonies, but offerings with eagle feathers are made for fertility, rain,
hunting—everything good in life.”).
139. See COHEN, supra note 129.
140. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 942 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
141. Id. at 943.
142. The severe disjunction between supply and demand for eagles necessitates some sort of
permitting system to allocate the eagle resource, as does the Eagle Act itself. 16 U.S.C. § 668a
(2006).
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eagle populations.143 Starting in the late 1940s, the use of DDT for
pest control, among other things, caused bald eagle populations to
plummet to the point where the Secretary of the Interior, in 1967,
listed the bald eagle in the lower forty-eight states as endangered.144
By 2007, bald eagle populations had rebounded sufficiently for the
FWS to remove the bald eagle from the list of species protected
under the Endangered Species Act.145 At that time, the FWS
estimated that there were 9,789 nesting pairs of bald eagles in the
lower forty eight states.146 “Bald eagles are now repopulating areas
throughout much of the species’ historical range that were
unoccupied only a few years ago.”147 They continue to face pressure,
however, from habitat modification, illegal taking, disease,
contaminants, electrocution on power lines, collisions with vehicles,
and in the future, collisions with wind energy facilities.148 Moreover,
the greater religious demand is for golden eagles.149 Although there
is no reliable data on golden eagle populations nationwide, the
species has been extirpated from much of its historic range, and
populations in the western United States are declining.150
Moreover, the increase in bald eagle populations has not
translated into equivalent increases in the supply of bald eagles at the
National Eagle Repository.151 Most of the eagles turned in to the
143. 77 Fed. Reg. 25,792, 25,794 (May 1, 2012).
144. Id. at 25,795; 32 Fed. Reg. 4001 (Mar. 11, 1967). Bald eagles were initially listed as
endangered under the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, formerly codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 668aa–668cc (2006). In 1978, the Secretary of the Interior listed bald eagles as
endangered in all of the lower forty-eight states except five, in which it was listed as threatened.
77 Fed. Reg. at 25,795. The bald eagle’s status was changed to threatened in all of the lower
forty-eight states in 1995. 60 Fed. Reg. 36,000 (July 12, 1995).
145. 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346 (July 9, 2007). The delisting of the bald eagle was predicated in part
on the continued protection of the species under the Eagle Act. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533(a)(1)(D),
(c)(2) (2006) (requiring Secretary to consider “inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms”
when determining whether to list or delist a species as threatened or endangered); 72 Fed. Reg.
37,353, 37,362–66, 37,367 (July 9, 2007); see also United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d
987, 991 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that when the Department of the Interior removed the bald eagle
from the endangered species list it emphasized that the eagle would continue to be protected
under the Eagle Act)
146. 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346, 37,347 (July 9, 2007).
147. 77 Fed. Reg. 25,792, 25,795 (May 1, 2012).
148. 72 Fed. Reg. at 37,358–70.
149. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2011).
150. 74 Fed. Reg. 46,836, 46,839 (Sept. 11, 2009); U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERV., FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: PROPOSAL TO PERMIT TAKE AS PROVIDED UNDER THE BALD
AND GOLDEN EAGLE PROTECTION ACT 52–54 (2009), available at http://www.fws.gov
/migratorybirds/CurrentBirdIssues/BaldEagle/FEA_EagleTakePermit_Final.pdf.
151. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291.
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Repository are killed in places where they are likely to be noticed by
a person, that is, on roads or under power lines.152 The FWS,
however, has reduced eagle mortality from vehicle collisions and
power-line electrocution.153 The Service has tried to maximize the
Repository’s supply by conducting outreach to the Service’s field
staff, state fish and game departments, tribes, and the general public
to ensure that those who find eagle carcasses know where to send
them.154 But “those very efforts to raise awareness have also led to
an increase in applications for eagle parts from eligible” tribal
members who were not previously aware of the Repository.155
The result is that tribal members have to wait long periods for
eagles and eagle feathers from the Repository:156 more than two and
one-half years for a whole bald eagle and three and one-half to four
years for a golden eagle.157 And the backlog at the Repository has
grown. In 1985, there were 527 applications pending at the
Repository.158 Now there are over six thousand,159 which is a
significant number, particularly when compared to the approximately
ten thousand nesting pairs of eagles in the lower forty-eight states.160
The scarcity problem promises to get worse, as the number of tribal
members is growing,161 and spirituality among tribal members may
152. Id.
153. Id.; see also United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 958–59 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing
government measures to reduce eagle deaths due to electrocution).
154. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291.
155. Id.; see also Wexler, supra note 63, at 185 (“Demand has increased significantly in
recent years as the word has gotten out that the Repository is the place to go for legal eagles.”).
156. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291; Friday, 525 F.3d at 944.
157. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291; Dan Frosch, A Repository for Eagles Finds Itself in Demand,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/us/a-repository-for-eagles-findsitself-in-demand.html.
158. United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301, 1303 (D.N.M. 1986).
159. Wexler, supra note 63, at 185; Coffman, supra note 138; Frosch, supra note 157; see
also Possession of Eagle Feathers and Parts by Native Americans, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
(Feb. 2009), http://www.fws.gov/le/pdf/PossessionOfEagleFeathersFactSheet.pdf (indicating that
there is a very high demand for eagle parts); National Eagle Repository, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE
SERV., http://www.fws.gov/le/Natives/EagleRepository.htm (stating that as of 1995 there were
3,000 more approved applications than there were available eagles); How Can I Obtain Eagle
Feathers or Parts?, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/faq/featherfaq.html
(“Currently, there are over 4,000 people on the waiting list for approximately 900 eagles the
Repository receives each year. Applicants can expect to wait approximately 2 and one half years
for an order to be filled.”).
160. See 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346, 37,347 (July 9, 2007).
161. See BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE
REPORT, at iii (2005), available at http://www.bia.gov/cs/groups/public/documents/text/idc001719.pdf.
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be on the rise too.162 No available data reveal what proportion of
tribal members require eagles for their religious practices, but it is
probably safe to assume that more tribal members will translate into
more applications to the Repository.
Religious demand for eagles among nonmembers is also
significant and growing. Although there are only about two million
members of federally recognized tribes, on the 2010 census 2.9
million people reported their race as solely American Indian or
Alaska Native—an increase of 18 percent since 2000—and another
2.3 million people reported having some Native ancestry—an
increase of 39 percent since 2000.163 Thus, more than three million
people who are not tribal members report having some Native
American ancestry. Again, no available data reveal what proportion
of those people practice Native American religions that require
eagles, but it is safe to assume that a “non-trivial” proportion of them
would request eagles from the Repository if they were eligible.164
And, of course, an unknown number of people have no Native
American ancestry, but practice Native American religions and need
eagles for religious purposes.165 Additionally, one million people in
the United States practice Afro-Caribbean religions, like Santeria,
that require eagles for religious rituals, and their number is
increasing as well.166 In sum, as Professor Raymond Bucko testified
at the Wilgus trial, “[w]hile hard numbers are elusive at best, what is
evident is that the numbers of persons, both Native and non-Native,
engaging in some type of Native American or ‘primal’ religious
practice is on the rise,” and the number of people whose religious

162. Frosch, supra note 157 (“More and more of our young people are going back to our
spiritual way of life, and we can’t do our ceremonies without the eagles.” (quoting Oglala Sioux
member Lee Plenty Wolf)); Appellant’s Appendix at 96, United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274
(10th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4046) (declaration of Associate Professor Raymond A. Bucko)
(“[P]eople who declare Native American religious participation is on the rise.”).
163. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE POPULATION:
2010, at 1, 4 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-10.pdf.
164. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[A] non-trivial number
of additional applicants would appear, if the rules were changed.”).
165. Id. at 1281–82, 1291.
166. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291; Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 467 (testimony of
Raphael Martinez). The government’s expert on Santeria in the Wilgus case explained that
Santerians worship their guardian spirit or “orisha” and that each orisha has favorite foods, colors,
plants, flowers, and animals—including eagles. Id. at 147 (affidavit of Raphael Martinez). “Bird
offerings are common in all Santeria rituals.” Id.
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practices “could possibly entail the use of [eagle] feathers” is
“trending upwards.”167
The imbalance between supply and demand for eagles feeds the
“thriving” black market.168 The FWS discovered crimes involving
24,984 eagles or eagle parts between 1997 and 2007, even though
fewer than two hundred officers nationwide engage in wildlife law
enforcement,169 and black market prices and activity are increasing
exponentially.170 Tribal members frustrated with the Repository
system are driven to the black market to fill their needs.171 The high
price paid for eagles on the black market may also lead tribal
members who receive eagles from the Repository to sell them on the
black market and seek more feathers from the Repository.172 In fact,
the majority of people charged with illegally taking or selling eagles
are tribal members.173
FWS law enforcement officers testified at the Wilgus trial that
pow-wow dance competitions, in which both tribal members and
nonmembers compete, also drive the black market by offering
sizeable cash prizes.174 Competitors are judged not only on their
dancing ability, but also on their regalia, which include feather fans
and bustles.175 “[T]he more decorated with eagle feathers a

167. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 97, 98 (declaration of Professor Raymond A.
Bucko).
168. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291; United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987, 989 (9th Cir.
2008) (citing S. Rep. No. 71-180, at 2 (1930)); see also Alabama-Tombigbee Rivers Coal. v.
Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 1250, 1273 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Other reports state that the trade in wildlife
products comprises the world’s second largest black market, trailing only trade in illegal
narcotics.”).
169. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 190 (summary of LEMIS Eagle Case Violation
and Property Data Since 1/1/1997 to 10/03/2007); id. at 508, 533 (testimony of FWS Information
Technology Specialist Mike McLeod and FWS Agent Edward Dominguez).
170. Id. at 89, 345 (declaration and testimony of FWS Special Agent Kevin Ellis); id. at 539,
541, 551 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward Dominguez).
171. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1283 (citing Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 86–87)
(noting testimony from FWS agents describing black market demand from pow-wow dance
competitions).
172. Id. at 1294.
173. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 555 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward
Dominguez).
174. Id. at 347–49, 364, 533–35 (testimony of FWS Special Agents Kevin Ellis and Edward
Dominguez). As explained above, the government does not prosecute tribal members for
possessing eagle feathers. See text accompanying notes 60–61. Hence, tribal members may use
eagle feathers from the Repository in pow-wow competitions.
175. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 86–87 (declaration of FWS Special Agent
Kevin Ellis).
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competitor’s costume, the more likely he is to win.”176 Some
costumes include feathers from as many as ten to twelve eagles.177
Dancers “are often looking for new and better feathers,” and people
who kill eagles “approach winners of pow-wows and attempt to sell
them feathers as they know cash for purchases is readily
available.”178 Hence, the demand for eagle feathers on the pow-wow
circuit is considerable,179 and attendance at pow-wows “seems to
have risen significantly over the last decade, thus increasing the
demand for migratory bird feathers.”180 Non-Native American
collectors drive up prices as well.181
The black market affects eagles directly because feathers
commonly enter the black market through illegal killing.182 FWS
Special Agent Edward Dominguez explained at the Wilgus trial that
the black market is supplied “by eagles being poisoned intentionally,
by people climbing up trees to steal young eaglets from nests and
nourishing them until they have molted to where their feathers are in
perfect condition, and people shooting livestock and game to lure
eagles to feed on them and then shooting the eagles.”183 As the
Supreme Court held in Andrus v. Allard,184 “It was reasonable for
Congress to conclude that the possibility of commercial gain presents
a special threat to the preservation of the eagles because that prospect
creates a powerful incentive both to evade statutory prohibitions
against taking birds and to take a large volume of birds.”185 In sum,
the imbalance between the supply and demand for eagles leaves the
species vulnerable and tribal religious needs unsatisfied.

176. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1283.
177. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 534 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward
Dominguez).
178. Id. at 87 (declaration of FWS Special Agent Kevin Ellis); id. at 364 (testimony of FWS
Special Agent Kevin Ellis).
179. See id. at 533–34 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward Dominguez).
180. Id. at 87 (declaration of FWS Special Agent Kevin Ellis).
181. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1283.
182. Appellant’s Appendix, supra note 162, at 88 (declaration of FWS Special Agent Kevin
Ellis).
183. Id. at 539 (testimony of FWS Agent Edward Dominguez).
184. 444 U.S. 51, 58 (1979).
185. Id. at 58.
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B. Inequality
One of the things that makes cases raising religious claims under
the Eagle Act particularly difficult is the Indian tribes exception.186
Allowing members of federally recognized tribes to take and possess
eagles while others with the same religious needs are prohibited from
doing so adds a layer of inequality in these cases. I believe that this
inequality is not only justifiable, but necessary.187 Nonetheless, the
differential treatment of individuals with the same religious needs
adds a tension to Eagle Act cases that should inspire us to question
the current regulatory scheme.
This sort of inequitable treatment of religious practitioners was
at the center of Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do
Vegetal.188 An Amazonian religious group filed suit under RFRA to
enjoin the government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act
to block the group’s importation and use of a hallucinogenic tea for
religious purposes.189 The Supreme Court rejected the government’s
argument that the Controlled Substances Act “simply admits of no
exceptions,”190 characterizing it as a “slippery slope” argument that
“[i]f I make an exception for you, I [would] have to make one for
everybody, so no exceptions.”191 Rather, the Court held that “RFRA
operates by mandating consideration . . . of exceptions to ‘rule[s] of
general applicability.’”192 Thus, under RFRA, courts must look
“beyond broadly formulated interests justifying” federal statutes and
“scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to
particular religious claimants.”193

186. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006).
187. Professor Worthen and James Dalton have already answered the concern that the Indian
tribes exception violates the Establishment Clause. See Worthen, supra note 23, at 1002–16
(concluding that that the Eagle Act is “compatible with the basic demands of equality” because
Native Americans are differently situated from non-Native Americans with respect to religion);
Dalton, supra note 22, at 1605–16; Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1287; Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, 957 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992). Both Hardman and Wilgus abandoned their
Establishment Clause claims in United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2002)
(en banc).
188. 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
189. Id. at 423.
190. Id. at 430.
191. Id. at 421, 436.
192. Id. at 436 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006)).
193. Id. at 431; see also id. at 439 (RFRA “requires the Government to address the particular
practice at issue”).
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The primary problem for the government in O Centro was that
the Controlled Substances Act authorizes the Attorney General to
waive the Act’s requirements in certain circumstances,194 and
regulations have long exempted the use of peyote for Native
American religious use.195 The government attempted to justify that
special treatment based on the United States’ “unique relationship”
with federally recognized Indian tribes,196 but the Court held that the
government failed to demonstrate how that unique legal status makes
tribal members “immune from the health risks the Government
asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I substance.”197
O Centro does not control the outcome in Eagle Act cases. In O
Centro, there was no indication that the supply of the hallucinogenic
tea was limited or that other religious groups were vying for the same
tea. In Eagle Act cases, in contrast, different groups compete for
access to the same limited resource, and the statute itself allows only
members of federally recognized Indian tribes to use that resource.198
Broadening the Indian tribes exception would not just alleviate the
religious burden on particular litigants. Instead, it would shift that
burden to other religious practitioners, namely, tribal members.199 O
Centro did not concern that sort of burden-shifting claim.200
Moreover, in Eagle Act cases, the government attempts to
comply with the Supreme Court’s instructions in O Centro: it
“weigh[s] the impact” of altering the regulatory scheme and tries to
demonstrate that “granting the requested religious accommodations
would seriously compromise its ability to administer” the Eagle
Act.201 The government has shown to the courts’ satisfaction what
the result would be if access to the resource were expanded.202
That said, the government is currently considering expanding
the use of eagles as a resource. When the bald eagle was listed as a
threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
194. Id. at 432–33 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 822(d)).
195. Id. at 433.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 434.
198. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2012).
199. See United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003).
200. See United States v. Vasquez-Ramos, 531 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Nothing in O
Centro Espírita undercuts the ruling in Antoine that this redistribution of burdens does not raise a
valid RFRA claim.”).
201. O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430, 435.
202. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1292–94 (10th Cir. 2011).
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sections 7 and 10 of that Act provided mechanisms for authorizing
bald eagle takes that were “associated with, but not the purpose of, a
human activity.”203 The FWS gave its assurance to holders of ESA
eagle take authorizations that it would not enforce the Eagle Act or
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act against them.204 The Service removed
the bald eagle from the list of threatened species in 2007205 and
issued regulations in 2009 to replace the now-inapplicable ESA take
authorizations.206 The 2009 regulations authorize the taking of bald
and golden eagles where the take is compatible with the preservation
of the species and is “associated with but not the purpose of [an]
activity.”207 In issuing these so-called “nonpurposeful take”
permits,208 the regulations require the Service to give higher priority
to “Native American religious use for rites and ceremonies that
require eagles be taken from the wild.”209 In other words, the Service
cannot issue a nonpurposeful take permit if the eagle population then
would be unable to accommodate additional takes of live eagles for
the religious purposes of Indian tribes.210
The FWS has not yet issued a nonpurposeful take permit for a
wind power facility, but it anticipates the demand for such permits
will reach an average of forty per year by the year 2020.211 Granting
those permits would shift the Eagle Act case law to more closely
resemble O Centro. If the Secretary determines that, after tribal
religious needs are met, eagle populations remain sufficiently robust
to allow eagles to be taken for power-generation purposes, O Centro
203. Eagle Permits; Take Necessary to Protect Interest in Particular Localities, 74 Fed. Reg.
46,836, 46,837 (Sept. 11, 2009).
204. Id. at 46,836.
205. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,346 (July 9, 2007)
(codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17).
206. Eagle Permits; Take Necessary to Protect Interest in Particular Localities, 74 Fed. Reg.
46,836 (Sept. 11, 2009) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 13, 22).
207. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(a) (2012).
208. Eagle Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting, 77 Fed. Reg.
22,267 (proposed Apr. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 13, 22).
209. 50 C.F.R. § 22.26(e)(4) (2012).
210. Id. § 22.26(f)(6). The regulations also specify that the Service retains the authority to
amend a permit “if new information indicates that revised permit conditions are necessary” or to
suspend or revoke a permit where doing so is “necessary to safeguard local or regional eagle
populations,” id. § 22.26(c)(7), but that provision does not appear to enable the Service to revoke
a permit if tribal religious needs increase.
211. Eagles Permits; Changes in the Regulations Governing Eagle Permitting, 77 Fed. Reg. at
22,272. New Era Wind recently filed the first application under these regulations. See Minn. Wind
Farm Seeks First Eagle-Kill Permit, EENEWS.NET (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.eenews.net
/Greenwire/2013/01/18/4.
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would appear to mandate that the government give at least as much
consideration to the religious needs of nonmembers as it gives to
power companies. Whether O Centro dictates the outcome in RFRA
challenges to the Eagle Act or not, however, the tension highlighted
in that case remains and provides impetus to question the current
regulatory scheme.
C. Tension Within the Case Law
In addition to the tension between eagle protection and the free
exercise of religion, which is compounded in Eagle Act cases by the
inequality of the Indian tribes exception, tension within the case law
itself provides further impetus to revisit the current regulatory
scheme. First, the courts of appeals disagree about the government’s
evidentiary burden in cases raising RFRA challenges to the Eagle
Act. In Hardman, the Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, remanded,
requiring the government to present “hard evidence” showing how
the current regulatory scheme “serve[s] each of its asserted
interests.”212 The court requested evidence of, among other things,
“how many eagles exist, in what direction the eagle population is
trending, how many people can be expected to apply for permits if
the regulations change, how much additional delay in delivering
eagle feathers to applicants could be expected under various
alternative schemes, and how much such delays might impact Native
American culture.”213 To meet that burden on remand in Hardman
and Wilgus, the prosecutors built a voluminous record214 addressing a
host of issues, including eagle populations and trends, the supply and
demand for eagles, the black market in eagles, the difficulties of
enforcing the Eagle Act, and the number of people who are not tribal
members but practice religions that require the use of eagles.215
The Ninth Circuit in Antoine, on the other hand, did not “believe
RFRA requires the government to make the showing the Tenth
Circuit demands of it,” because the consequences of expanding the
Indian tribes exception to nonmembers “are predictable.”216 Judge
212. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1132 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
213. See id. at 1135.
214. See United States v. Wilgus, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1315 (D. Utah 2009). (“After the
case was remanded, this Court has heard testimony over several days from numerous witnesses
and has accepted the uncontested affidavits of them and many others.”).
215. See United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1281–83, 1291–92 (10th Cir. 2011).
216. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003).
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Kozinski, writing for the court, reasoned that, because the demand
for eagles exceeds the fixed supply, “the burden on religion is
inescapable; the only question is whom to burden and how much.”217
Antoine’s claim sought not to reduce the burden on religion, but to
shift his religious burden onto others and therefore was “not a viable
RFRA claim; an alternative can’t fairly be called ‘less restrictive’ if
it places additional burdens on other believers.”218
The circuits are also out of step with each other regarding which
compelling interests the Indian tribes exception furthers. The Tenth
Circuit in United States v. Wilgus held that the Indian tribes
exception furthers the government’s compelling interest in “fostering
the culture and religion of federally-recognized Indian tribes.”219
That holding was consistent with the First Circuit’s pre-RFRA
decision in Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.220 But
the uniformity ends there.
The inconsistency in the case law arises from the disjunction
between the plain language of the exception and the regulations
implementing it. The exception allows the Secretary “to permit the
taking, possession, and transportation” of eagles “for the religious
purposes of Indian tribes.”221 Yet, the regulations provide for issuing
permits not to Indian tribes, but rather to individual members of
federally recognized Indian tribes.222 Thus, in Hardman, the Tenth
Circuit held that the government has a compelling interest in
“fulfilling trust obligations to Native Americans,”223 but it did not
see how “restricting personal, individual permits for religious
purposes to members of federally recognized tribes is connected to
the government’s sovereign-to-sovereign relationships with
tribes.”224 In other words, the court did not see how the Indian tribes
exception furthers the compelling interest in fulfilling the
government’s trust obligations. The Eleventh Circuit in Gibson, in
contrast, held that the Indian tribes exception furthers the United
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1295.
220. 957 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992).
221. 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006) (emphasis added).
222. 50 C.F.R. § 22.22 (2012) (“We will issue a permit only to members of Indian entities
recognized and eligible to receive services from the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs listed
under 25 U.S.C. 479a-1.”).
223. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1129 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
224. Id. at 1134.

Fall 2013]

EAGLES & INDIAN TRIBES

85

States’ interest in fulfilling treaty obligations to federally recognized
Indian tribes.225 The Tenth Circuit in Hardman did not find that
interest compelling,226 but even if it had, it may not have believed
that granting permits to individual tribal members fulfills treaty
obligations that are generally owed to Indian tribes.227
The Ninth Circuit has not identified which compelling interests
the Indian tribes exception serves, because it held that any claim
seeking to shift a litigant’s religious burden onto others is not viable
under RFRA.228 The Eighth Circuit has had no need to identify the
interests underlying the Indian tribes exception either, because it has
addressed only the claim of a tribal member charged with taking an
eagle without a permit.229 That claim required the court of appeals to
identify only the interests underlying the permit requirement, not the
Indian tribes exception.230 Thus, the question of which compelling
interests the Indian tribes exception furthers is another point of
tension in the case law.
Finally, while panels of the Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh
Circuits have upheld the Eagle Act against RFRA challenges,231 that
uniformity may not persist. The Act remains potentially vulnerable
en banc in those circuits, at the panel level in other circuits, and in
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court’s decision in O Centro,
although not directly controlling in Eagle Act cases, reflects a
sympathy for religious practitioners and a skepticism about the legal
status of federally recognized Indian tribes that could undermine the
Eagle Act in the courts of appeals and in the Supreme Court itself.
D. Regulatory Burden on Tribal Members
Another, more important reason to revisit the current regulatory
scheme is the burden it imposes on tribal members. The Tenth
Circuit in Friday was “skeptical that the bare requirement of
obtaining a permit [to take eagles] can be regarded as a ‘substantial
225. Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam).
226. Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1129 n.19.
227. See Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he very great
majority of Indian treaties create tribal, not individual rights.” (quoting Hebah v. United States,
428 F.2d 1334, 1337 (Ct. Cl. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
228. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003).
229. United States v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2001).
230. Id. (“[U]nrestricted access to bald eagles would destroy [the] legitimate and
conscientious eagle population conservation goal of the [Eagle Act].”).
231. See cases cited supra notes 87, 93, 103 and accompanying text.
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burden’ under RFRA.”232 The court pointed out correctly that many
religious activities require government authorization, like building a
church or operating a religious school.233 No doubt, the court was
correct that the requirement to obtain a permit before taking an eagle
does not rise to the level of a substantial burden under RFRA. But it
is, nonetheless, a burden. One tribal member remarked that “[i]t’s the
same as having to have a permit to carry a cross.”234 And tribal
members who seek not to take eagles but to obtain parts from the
Repository must not only fill out an application form, but also wait
long periods of time to obtain items that are central to their religious
practice.235
These regulatory burdens drive some tribal members to find
alternative, illegal sources of eagles.236 Frustration with the current
regulatory scheme therefore increases pressure on eagle
populations.237 Even when tribal members make the effort to jump
through the regulatory hoops and obtain items from the Repository,
they sometimes find the quality of the parts unsatisfactory.238 And
tribal members object to the regulatory provision that, by accepting
an eagle permit, the permittee consents to inspection by FWS
agents.239 That the group intended to benefit from the Indian tribes
232. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 947 (10th Cir. 2008). But see United States v.
Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1126–27 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (“Any scheme that limits their
access to eagle feathers therefore must be seen as having a substantial effect on the exercise of
religious belief.”); United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1377, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We do not
question that the BGEPA imposed a substantial burden on the practice of such religions by
restricting the ability of adherents to obtain and possess eagles and eagle parts.”).
233. Friday, 525 F.3d at 947.
234. Steven Bodzin, A Troubling Chapter in the Bald Eagle's Success Story, L.A. TIMES,
July 18, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2005/jul/18/nation/na-eagles18.
235. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291 (indicating that even tribal members who only seek eagle
feathers may need to wait anywhere from three to six months); Friday, 525 F.3d at 944 (stating
that the estimated wait time for a “whole tail” from the Repository is 3.5 years).
236. See Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1377–78; see also De Meo, supra note 23, at 790 (“These long
delays, coupled with the immediacy of certain religious ceremonies, force some Native
Americans to violate this permit procedure in order to follow their religious beliefs.”).
237. See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1291–92 (quoting the testimony of FWS agents and asserting
that “[m]any Native Americans who would normally obtain [eagle] feathers from legal
sources . . . turn to the black market due to frustration in obtaining feather legally”); Appellant’s
Appendix, supra note 162, at 539 (testimony of FWS Special Agents Kevin Ellis and Edward
Dominguez) (stating that the black market is supplied by people poisoning and shooting eagles,
or by stealing young eaglets from their nests).
238. Friday, 525 F.3d at 944; Coffman, supra note 138.
239. Friday, 525 F.3d at 951 (“If construed to allow Fish and Wildlife Service agents to
attend the offering-lodge ceremony at the Sun Dance, Mr. Friday contends, this condition would
violate the sacred nature of the ritual.”); 50 C.F.R. § 13.21(e)(2) (2012).
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exception is so dissatisfied with its administration necessitates
revisiting its implementation.240
For all of these reasons, it is worth considering whether there is
a way to alleviate the tensions in Eagle Act cases that also addresses
some of the practical problems with the current regulatory approach.
My suggestion follows.
IV. ALLEVIATING THE TENSIONS
There does not appear to be any way to alleviate the baseline
scarcity problem in Eagle Act cases sufficiently. Permits to operate
aviaries and propagate eagles in captivity will help by generating a
supply of molted feathers for religious use.241 But very few tribes
have taken the opportunity to establish aviaries, and the regulations
authorizing captive propagation of eagles have not been finalized.242
Thus, there is no reason to think that those options will eliminate the
severe disjunction between supply and demand. We must take the
scarcity problem as a given.243
Because eagles are a limited resource that faces competing
demands—use and preservation—the Eagle Act pits two compelling
interests against each other. The Act requires the government to
protect the needs of recognized Indian tribes while simultaneously
protecting eagle populations. One district court explained:
Were the [Eagle Act] to simply ban possession for all
persons, the government would have succeeded in
protecting eagle parts, but failed to protect Native American
culture. Were the [Eagle Act] to allow all persons to possess
the eagle parts for any religious use, it would create severe
difficulties in enforcing poaching laws, because it is (1)
very rare to catch poachers in the act of poaching, and (2)
nearly impossible to determine whether the birds were
240. See generally U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF TRIBAL JUSTICE, DOJ
CONSIDERATION OF EAGLE FEATHERS POLICY: TRIBAL CONSULTATION AND RESPONSE TO
TRIBAL COMMENTS 11 (2012), available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2012/06
/consultation-on-proposed-dojeagle-feathers-policy-framing-p.pdf
(summarizing
tribes’
frustration with the current administration of the Eagle Act); Frosch, supra note 157 (“Having to
wait so long to use eagles in religious ceremonies has become a source of frustration for many
tribes.”).
241. A national aviary operated by the FWS would ease the scarcity problem as well.
242. See supra note 64.
243. United States v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1291 (10th Cir. 2011) (“We must take the
current level of supply of eagle parts . . . as a given.”).
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poached or not, when confiscated. Not only would the
waiting period swell, making it difficult for the recognized
tribes to use birds for their ceremonies, but the black market
would also increase, since more people would be able to
possess eagle feathers—legally or illegally procured—
without fear of prosecution. In the long run, eagle
populations would suffer. In the ensuing eagle scarcity, the
government would have failed at both of its objectives.244
The courts have concluded that the Indian tribes exception “sets
those interests in equipoise.”245 As the First Circuit observed in
Rupert, “[a]ny diminution of the exemption would adversely affect
[the interest in protecting Native American religion and culture], but
any extension of it would adversely affect [the interest in protecting a
dwindling and precious eagle population].”246
Although there is no way to balance those compelling interests
without sacrificing one or the other, some of the tensions in the Eagle
Act may be alleviated simply by changing the FWS’s administration
of the Indian tribes exception. The alternative I propose is for the
FWS to issue eagle take and possession permits to tribes instead of
individual tribal members and ultimately turn over much of the
administration of the Indian tribes exception to the tribes acting
collectively. The first step to implementation is for the FWS to
amend its regulations to provide for the issuance of permits under the
Indian tribes exception to federally recognized Indian tribes. The
FWS has issued the Hopi tribe’s chairman a permit to take eagles

244. United States v. Winddancer, 435 F. Supp. 2d 687, 698 (M.D. Tenn. 2006).
245. Rupert v. Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 35 (1st Cir. 1992); see
also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 743–44 (1986) (“Congress thus considered the special
cultural and religious interests of Indians, balanced those needs against the conservation purposes
of the statute, and provided a specific, narrow exception.”).
246. 957 F.2d at 35; see also Winddancer, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 698 (“In forming its
categorization on a political basis, the government has balanced its two competing objectives in
the only way this court has been shown to be possible. By limiting the number of people who can
possess the feathers, the government succeeds in limiting the potential customers for the black
market in eagle feathers. It also keeps the waiting period for the eagle repository low. By granting
access to the feathers only to members of the officially recognized tribes, the government protects
those tribes in the only way possible under the Establishment Clause.”). Cf. Wilgus, 638 F.3d at
1295 (holding that the existing permitting scheme is the least restrictive means of furthering the
government’s compelling interests). But cf. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir.
2003) (“Any allocation of the ensuing religious burdens” between members and nonmembers of
recognized tribes “is least restrictive because reconfiguration would necessarily restrict
someone’s free exercise.”).
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annually since 1986.247 Since 1997, each of these permits has
authorized the take of up to forty golden eagles for religious
purposes.248 The tribe itself allocates those forty eagle takes to its
members.249 The Hopi take permit could serve as a model for other
tribes not just for permits to take eagles, but also for permits to
possess eagles. Because there is an insufficient supply of eagles,
however, the stakeholders would have to determine, among other
things, how to allocate the eagle resource initially among the
federally recognized tribes and what to do with the people who are
already on the Repository’s waiting list.
Further down the road, when the process of issuing permits to
tribes is established and the less administratively sophisticated tribes
have developed the necessary governance structures, more of the
permit system’s administration could be turned over to the tribes
acting collectively. The tribes could be empowered to define the
contours of the Indian tribes exception, including perhaps defining
who is entitled to take and possess eagles and for what purposes;
how they may be obtained, transferred, and disposed; and how the
initial allocation of permits should be changed. Tribes might also
suggest more fundamental changes to the permit system that I have
not anticipated.
Whether this approach is viewed as a recognition of tribes’
cultural property rights to the eagle resource, as a common
ownership solution to the tragedy of the eagle commons, or as
another example of tribal self-determination, this proposal would
alleviate, or at least help to justify, the inequality of the current
scheme. It would do this by bringing the administration of the Indian
tribes exception into line with the plain language of the statute, thus
emphasizing the exception’s inherently political nature. It would also
247. United States v. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123 (D. Ariz. 2006); Boradiansky,
supra note 22, at 711 n.14.
248. Tawahongva, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1123. “Additionally, the State of Arizona has permitted
the Hopi to take ten golden eagles per year from state lands, and the Navajo Nation has permitted
the Hopi to take twelve eagles per year from Navajo reservation lands each year from 1998
through 2003.” Id.
249. See id. (stating that the 2005 FWS permit granted to the Hopi tribe allowed “the [Hopi]
Chairman and any tribal members designated by him to take forty golden eagles”) (internal
quotations omitted). The bylaws of the Hopi Tribe require the Tribal Council to “negotiate with
the United States Government agencies concerned, and with other tribes and other persons
concerned, in order to secure protection of the right of the Hopi Tribe to hunt for eagles in its
traditional territories.” CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS OF THE HOPI TRIBE, By-Laws art. IV
(1937), available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/hopicons.html.
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alleviate some of the burden that the current scheme imposes on
tribal members, while providing regulatory benefits for the
government. This part first explores the theoretical foundations upon
which this proposal rests, then explains how it would alleviate some
of the tensions in the Eagle Act, and concludes with a few brief
thoughts on implementation.
A. Theoretical Foundations
Three lines of scholarship support this approach. First, Kristen
Carpenter and others have developed a theory of indigenous cultural
property premised on the idea that certain resources are integral to
indigenous group identity and therefore deserving of legal
protection.250 Applying that framework here entails recognizing that,
because eagles are central to tribal identity, they are a form of
cultural property, and therefore tribes should be empowered to define
the contours of the stewardship regime for eagles. Second,
scholarship proposing community property solutions to
overexploitation of commons resources suggests the same result.251
And finally, my proposal goes part of the way toward giving tribes
the sort of meaningful self-determination that Indian-law academics
have urged in recent years. My goal in this section is not to give
comprehensive accounts of the voluminous literature on these
subjects, but merely to place my proposal within these scholarly
frameworks.
1. Acknowledging Cultural Property Rights
In an article entitled In Defense of Property, Professors Kristen
Carpenter, Sonia Katyal, and Angela Riley responded to scholarly
criticism of indigenous groups’ recent attempts to use property law to
protect cultural resources.252 They argued that the critics’ conception
of property is too narrow because “[i]n reality, indigenous cultural
property transcends the classic legal concepts.”253 In proposing an
alternative framework, Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley made two
moves that are particularly salient here. First, they extended
250. Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1028.
251. Johnson, supra note 30, at 246 (proposing a community governance model “to address
concerns in the credit default swap market”); Sinden, supra note 30, at 546–47 (“[C]ommon
ownership regimes can . . . in some circumstances avert the tragedy of the commons.”).
252. Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1024–26.
253. Id. at 1027; see also id. at 1046.
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Margaret Jane Radin’s theory of property “as an element of
individual personhood”254 to “a model of property and peoplehood”
premised on the idea that certain resources are integral to indigenous
group identity and thus deserving of legal protection as “cultural
property.”255 Second, they moved from a classic ownership paradigm
to a stewardship paradigm, grounded on “the exercise of rights and
obligations independent of title.”256 The stewardship model “captures
property as a ‘web of interests,’ rather than a discrete bundle of
rights or sticks,”257 and reveals “the unique ways in which
indigenous groups may exercise cultural property entitlements as
nonowners.”258 Ultimately, Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley contended
that indigenous peoples should be legally empowered to define their
own notions of cultural property.259 Thus, their stewardship model
may yield a variety of practical results: some cultural property may
be alienable, while other cultural property may be kept out of the
market; some may be laid to rest, and some may be preserved for
access and use.260
Applying Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s cultural property
framework here would entail first recognizing that eagles are central
to tribal identity and thus viewing that resource as a form of cultural
property in which tribes have an interest that should be given some
form of legal recognition. Eagles are a critical component of many
Native American religions, and for many tribes, religion is an
inextricable part of tribal sovereignty.261 “[T]he primary purpose of
tribal religion is for the survival of the tribe itself, and not for
individual salvation.”262 Native American religions are “holistic and
integrated in the sense that there is no separation between religion
254. Id. at 1050 (citing Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957 (1982)).
255. Id. at 1028 (emphasis added); see also Carpenter, Real Property and Peoplehood, supra
note 29, at 322–23 (“[W]hereas Radin focuses on property that expresses individual personhood,
I am interested in property that expresses collective ‘peoplehood.’”).
256. Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1067; see also id. at 1069 (elaborating on the concept
of stewardship).
257. Id. at 1080 (quoting Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property:
Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002))
258. Id. at 1088.
259. Id. at 1086.
260. Id. at 1085.
261. See Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 442; Worthen, supra note 23, at
998–99, 1014–15.
262. Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 441–42.

92

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:53

and other aspects of life.”263 Thus, tribal members “do not
necessarily distinguish religious practice from cultural or political
activity.”264
Indeed, the Indian tribes exception can be read as an
acknowledgment of the tribal cultural property interest in eagles.
Interior’s recommendation that Congress include an exception to the
Eagle Act for Indian tribes’ religious needs was premised on its
recognition that eagles are an integral part of many tribes’ identities.
Interior pointed out to Congress that the golden eagle was “important
in enabling many Indian tribes, particularly those in the Southwest,
to continue ancient customs and ceremonies that are of deep religious
or emotional significance to them.”265
Second, Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s framework suggests that,
given their cultural property interest in the eagle resource, tribes
should be included in defining the contours of the stewardship
regime for eagles: who is entitled to take and possess eagles and for
what purposes, and how they may be obtained, transferred, and
disposed.266 In other words, the administration of the Indian tribes
exception itself would be handed over, at least in part, to the tribes.
Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley would have no objection to partial
empowerment of tribes since, “from [these authors’] perspective,
assertions of cultural property rights . . . rarely . . . vest indigenous
peoples with . . . absolute powers of control, exclusion, or
alienation.”267
In the Eagle Act context, two statutory constraints would
necessarily remain. The initial, biological determination of how
many permits can be issued “compatible with the preservation” of
the species would have to stay with Interior.268 I would not go so far
as to say that the cultural property interest in the eagle resource is so
complete as to empower tribes to completely decimate the species,
263. Worthen, supra note 23, at 1004.
264. Dalton, supra note 22, at 1614.
265. Miscellaneous Fish and Wildlife Legislation: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
87th Cong. 3 (1962) [hereinafter House Hearings 1962].
266. See Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1029.
267. Kristen A. Carpenter, Sonia K. Katyal & Angela R. Riley, Clarifying Cultural Property,
17 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL PROP. 581, 585 (2010); see also id. at 587 (“[I]n some instances,
indigenous peoples’ claims may need to accommodate other’s interests in science, speech, or
invention.”).
268. See 16 U.S.C. § 668a (2006).
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thus abrogating the rest of society’s interests in the preservation of
our national symbol. The other statutory constraint that would persist
is that only uses that can be considered “religious” would be
permissible. Since tribes would decide for themselves what that term
means, it might not impose much of a constraint in practice. Beyond
those statutory constraints, however, the Indian tribes exception
permitting process can ultimately be turned over to the tribes.269
Applying Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s cultural property
paradigm to eagles does not raise the same concerns as applying it to
land. Unlike land, living wildlife is not seen as capable of being
owned by individuals.270 The Supreme Court explained in Geer v.
Connecticut271 that “the ownership of wild animals, so far as they are
capable of ownership, is in the State, not as a proprietor, but in its
sovereign capacity as the representative and for the benefit of its
people in common.”272 Thus, living wildlife cannot be privately
owned, “except in so far as the people may elect to make it so.”273
The Supreme Court whittled away at Geer for many years until it
finally repudiated Geer’s holding and denounced the state ownership
doctrine as a legal fiction in Hughes v. Oklahoma.274 However,
Hughes simply affirmed the federal government’s supreme authority
to regulate wildlife;275 it did not hold that living wildlife can be
privately owned.276 As Professor Babcock explained, “Hughes
neither disturbed the common law canon of the State’s preeminent
269. The first phase of my proposal is consistent with Kristen Carpenter’s “empowering
practices” approach by which tribes and agencies develop religious accommodations “that are
informed by the tribal religions themselves.” Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at
400. In fact, Carpenter highlights the eagle take permit the FWS recently issued to the chairman
of the Northern Arapaho tribe, see infra note 397, as an example of this approach. Carpenter,
Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 465–66. The second phase of my proposal extends beyond
the “empowering practices” approach to implement the tribal cultural property interest in eagles,
as suggested by Carpenter’s earlier work with Professors Katyal and Riley. See Carpenter et al.,
supra note 29.
270. See Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Protect Where
the Wild Things Are? Of Beavers, Bob-O-Links, and Other Things That Go Bump in the Night, 85
IOWA L. REV. 849, 883–89 (2000).
271. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
272. Id. at 529 (quoting State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393, 400 (1894)).
273. Id. (quoting Ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 483 (1894)).
274. 441 U.S. 322, 335 (1979).
275. See John D. Echeverrria & Julie Lurman, “Perfectly Astounding” Public Rights: Wildlife
Protection and the Takings Clause, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 331, 366–67 (2003).
276. Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I): Applying
Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 62
(2000).
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interest in and responsibility for preserving wildlife . . . , nor did it
disturb the idea that the State acts on behalf of its citizens when it
takes steps to preserve wildlife.”277 Unlike land, wildlife has
traditionally been considered a public resource.278 As a result,
shifting from federal stewardship to tribal stewardship would not
undermine individual property rights, but would merely replace one
governmental steward with another.279
2. Collectivizing Ownership of the Commons
In more traditional natural-resources-management terms, my
suggestion can be conceptualized as an alternative solution to a
tragedy of the commons. In an essay in Science magazine in 1968,
biology professor Garrett Hardin addressed “the population
problem.”280 Professor Hardin sketched a scenario involving a
pasture open to all. Hardin anticipated that each herdsman, acting in
his rational self-interest, would maximize the number of cattle he
grazed on the pasture, leading to the pasture’s ruin.281 Thus, Hardin
concluded that “[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”282 The
only solutions to this tragedy of the commons, according to Professor
Hardin, are to privatize the commons or “allocate the right to enter
them.”283 For commons that “cannot readily be fenced,” like air and
water, Hardin posited that “coercive laws or taxing devices” are the
only solutions.284 Hardin acknowledged that “[e]very new enclosure
277. Babcock, supra note 270, at 886; see also id. at 889 (“[T]he Court left intact the State’s
underlying, preeminent fiduciary duty to protect wildlife on behalf of its citizens.”); Wood, supra
note 276, at 53 & n.258, 58–62 (“[T]he Court [in Geer] set forth a principle of sovereign
trusteeship in wildlife that endures to this day.”).
278. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 221, 265 (2010) (“Air, water, and wildlife are other examples of
environmental physical public resources.”).
279. Applying Carpenter, Katyal and Riley’s framework to eagles, which, like all wildlife,
have traditionally been considered a form of property, also does not raise the same concerns as
applying their framework to other forms of cultural patrimony that have not traditionally been
subject to property laws. See Derek Fincham, The Distinctiveness of Property and Heritage, 115
PENN. ST. L. REV. 641, 665–66 (2011) (criticizing Carpenter, et al. for not distinguishing between
cultural property and cultural heritage and fully accounting for the limitations of property-based
theories).
280. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243 (1968), available at
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/162/3859/1243.full.pdf.
281. Id. at 1244.
282. Id. Hardin was not the first to identify the tragedy of the commons. See OSTROM, supra
note 30, at 2; Sinden, supra note 30, at 546 & n.35.
283. Hardin, supra note 269, at 1245.
284. Id.
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of the commons involves the infringement of somebody’s personal
liberty,” but he thought that compromising personal liberty,
particularly of the “freedom to breed,” is essential to the survival of
humankind.285
Nobel Prize winning political economist Elinor Ostrom
contested Hardin’s conclusion that privatization and government
regulation are the only possible solutions to the tragedy of the
commons.286 She argued that “neither the state nor the market is
uniformly successful in enabling individuals to sustain long-term,
productive use of natural resource systems.”287 In her seminal work,
Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action, Ostrom detailed her case studies of alternatives to state- and
market-based solutions to commons problems and developed a
“theory of collective action whereby a group of principals can
organize themselves voluntarily to retain the residuals of their own
efforts.”288 “[M]ore than any other scholar,” Ostrom “overturned the
assumption that free riding would reign in a commons given the
tendency toward individual self-interest. Instead, she . . .
demonstrated that many social groups have struggled successfully
against threats of resource degradation by developing and
maintaining self-governing institutions.”289
Scholars have continued to explore common property solutions
to the tragedy of the commons in various contexts.290 Professor
285. Id. at 1248.
286. OSTROM, supra note 30, at 1. Others have criticized Hardin for discounting the
possibility of community management of resources. See, e.g., Joseph W. Dellapenna, The
Evolution of Riparianism in the United States, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 53, 67 (2011) (“[Hardin]
largely ignored the possibility of community management (public property, if you will) as an
alternative possibility to privatizing the ‘commons.’”); Sinden, supra note 30, at 546–47 (“Hardin
was criticized for not recognizing that common ownership regimes can also in some
circumstances avert the tragedy of the commons.”); see also Carol Rose, The Comedy of the
Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Public Policy, U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 720 (1986) (exploring
“inherently public property” as an alternative solution to market failures).
287. OSTROM, supra note 30, at 1.
288. Id. at 25; see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (demonstrating
that people largely resolve disputes and govern themselves through informal social rules, rather
than through a state system or central authority).
289. Foster, supra note 30, at 82.
290. E.g., Brigham Daniels, Governing the Presidential Nomination Commons, 84 TUL. L.
REV. 899 (2010) (analyzing the trend toward earlier presidential primaries as a tragedy of the
commons); Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking on Public Roads, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 515, 515 (2002) (examining how private rights in parking spaces are allocated
based on rules that govern the public parking commons); Foster, supra note 30, at 62 (discussing
collective resource management as an alternative to the tragedy of the commons); Gregg W.
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Kristin Johnson, for example, recently advocated a “community
governance model” to solve the commons problem in credit default
swap markets.291 Concluding that the traditional approaches to
solving the tragedy of the commons “spectacularly fail,”292 Johnson
proposed a model, premised on Elinor Ostrom’s work, that “involves
the creation of an institution managed directly by resource users with
oversight by an external authority.”293 The external authority
enforces standards that reflect the community’s “normative
expectations” and prevent overexploitation of the commons. This
structure gives “the benefits of an openly accessible resource while
curbing self-interested behavior.”294
The national eagle population can be viewed as a commons that
is currently managed by “coercion by an external, central regulatory
authority”; the FWS “exercise[s] authority to issue and revoke
licenses that grant rights to use commons resources.”295 Absent that
regulatory control, individual free-exercise rights to use eagles would
compromise the resource beyond repair. That is not, however, an
optimal solution to the tragedy of the eagle commons, if only
because tribal members are deeply dissatisfied with the current
regulatory structure.296
By distributing aggregate permits to tribes, the first stage of my
proposal draws some of the benefits of a privatization solution to the
tragedy of the commons. When a commons is privatized, certain
users are given the right to exploit the commons and exclude others,
Kettles, Regulating Vending in the Sidewalk Commons, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 32–35 (2004)
(concluding that sidewalk vending does not necessarily lead to a tragedy of the commons);
Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Constructing Commons in
the Cultural Environment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 659 (2010) (applying Ostrom’s work to
“environments for developing and distributing cultural and scientific knowledge through
institutions that support pooling and sharing that knowledge in a managed way”); Pammela
Quinn Saunders, A Sea Change Off the Coast of Maine: Common Pool Resources as Cultural
Property, 60 EMORY L.J. 1323 (2011) (developing a model for recognizing group property rights
in communities that are the de facto stewards of common pool resources).
291. Johnson, supra note 30, at 175.
292. Id. at 218.
293. Id. at 244.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 220; see also OSTROM, supra note 30, at 8–9 (examining the argument that
problems related to the tragedy of the commons cannot be solved through cooperation, and
governmental control with “major coercive powers” is the overwhelming solution).
296. See supra Part III.D. Sheila Foster observed that overconsumption of a common resource
that is managed by the government can result from “regulatory slippage,” that is, reduced
enforcement of regulatory standards. Foster, supra note 30, at 67.
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which gives those users the incentive “to use the resource at
sustainable levels.”297 “Privatization, it is thought, allocates resources
to those who value them most, to the benefit of everyone in
society.”298 My proposal is far from a perfect example of an effective
privatization solution to the tragedy of the commons, if such a thing
exists;299 I do not propose that the FWS relinquish its regulatory
obligation to determine how many eagle permits are compatible with
species preservation, much less convey title to individual birds. As
Professor Sinden pointed out, solutions like mine are not truly
“privatization,” because they do not use the market to solve the
commons problem, but instead use government regulation “to
address the central ‘how much’ question of environmental law.”300
My proposal only constitutes privatization to the extent that that term
refers to “a broad spectrum of policy choices or mechanisms that
shift some responsibility from the government to private actors.”301
Yet, dividing the eagle commons among recognized tribes would
give the tribes a more direct interest in ensuring the sustainability of
eagle populations and perhaps “introduce[] greater flexibility and
efficiency in the management and oversight” of the eagle resource.302
Under the current regulatory structure, tribes play no role and thus
have no incentive to maximize resource sustainability or
management efficiency.
The second stage of my proposal is a variant of a common
ownership regime insofar as it allows the tribes themselves to set
some of the parameters for the regulatory scheme.303 Professor
Sinden explained that “common ownership” is a “property rights
system” wherein “group members jointly hold property rights in the
resource as against the rest of the world.”304 Common ownership
regimes are distinguishable from privatization regimes, however,

297. Johnson, supra note 30, at 218–19.
298. Id. at 219 (citing Rose, supra note 286, at 711–12).
299. See OSTROM, supra note 30, at 13 (noting difficulty of applying privatization solutions
to “nonstationary resources” like fish); Sinden, supra note 30, at 605–10 (explaining difficulties
with attempts to privatize wildlife commons).
300. Sinden, supra note 30, at 538.
301. Foster, supra note 30, at 109.
302. Id. at 110.
303. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 244.
304. Sinden, supra note 30, at 547.
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because the former rely on collective decision-making, instead of the
free market, to allocate the resource.305
Sinden cautioned that “common property regimes don’t really
get us very far in terms of solving the tragedy of the commons in
most real-world situations” because they only work in “cultural
conditions that are becoming ever less common as small
communities become increasingly integrated into a global
economy.”306 Insofar as my proposal is a common ownership regime,
it may depend for its success on a community of “relatively small
size, stable membership, and . . . homogenous culture where norms
of reciprocity and trust predominate.”307 Although the 566 federally
recognized Indian tribes exhibit great variety, relatively the tribal
community in the United States is small, stable, and culturally
homogeneous. Recognized tribes share history, beliefs,
vulnerabilities, and needs. Thus, they share enough attributes to
make a common ownership regime a viable alternative to the current
regulatory system under the Eagle Act.308 Professor Foster observed
that, with regard to urban commons, local governments play an
important role in enabling and sustaining the collective action
necessary for a common property regime to prosper.309 One of her
central insights was that an inverse relationship exists between what
she terms “endogenous variables”—i.e., the size and homogeneity of
the resource user group and the scale of the resource—and the role of
the government.310 Smaller, more homogeneous user groups are
better able to cooperatively manage discrete, local common

305. Id. at 548.
306. Id.
307. Id.; see also Foster, supra note 30, at 84 (“Collective action . . . is particularly successful
where there exists a resource with clearly defined boundaries and a community with stable
membership and a homogeneous culture, who also share beliefs, a history, or expectation of
continued interaction and reciprocity.”); id. at 91 (“The ability of collective commons
management regimes to remain stable and endure over time can be very much dependent on
community size and knittedness, community makeup, stability of community membership,
resource scale, and shared social norms/social capital.”).
308. Elinor Ostrom concluded that institutional change also requires resource users to “share
a common judgment that they will be harmed if they do not adopt an alternative rule”; “be
affected in similar ways by the proposed rule changes”; “highly value the continuation activities
from this [resource]”; and “face relatively low information, transformation, and enforcement
costs.” OSTROM, supra note 30, at 211. Those factors are largely satisfied or can be satisfied in
this context.
309. Foster, supra note 30, at 83, 88–91.
310. Id. at 92.
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resources with limited government involvement.311 As the scale and
complexity of the resource increases, the government plays a
stronger role.312 Hence, in the Eagle Act context, the FWS’s
coordinating role can be tailored to the tribal community and the
eagle resource to minimize the transaction costs of my proposal and
make improvements in the regulatory structure more likely to last.313
Because the number of eagles will not change, individual tribal
members are not likely to have any greater access to eagles under my
proposal. Nonetheless, because their own tribal governments will
“participate in the development of governing rules” regarding when,
where, how, and why eagles may be taken or possessed, tribal
members can be expected “to perceive regulation as having greater
legitimacy.”314 That perception can only benefit eagle populations.
3. Furthering Self-Determination
Issuing permits to tribes instead of individual tribal members
also would be consistent with the scholarly response to modern
federal Indian policy, which emphasizes tribal self-determination and
self-governance. Beginning in the early 1960s, federal Indian policy
began to shift toward promoting “the practical exercise of inherent
sovereign powers possessed by Indian tribes.”315 In 1975, Congress
aligned itself with this approach by passing the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act,316 which required the
Bureau of Indian Affairs to delegate the administration of health,
education, economic development, and other social programs to
tribal governments via contracts.317 Under so-called “638 contracts,”
“the tribe would perform the federal government’s functions under
311. Id.
312. Id. at 92; see also id. at 123 (“[T]he size and scale of the resource necessarily influences
the degree of responsibility, range of function, and discretion allowed the collective regime.”).
313. Id. at 92–93.
314. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 245.
315. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.07 (2009); see also Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, Indian Wars: Old and New, 15 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 201, 203–13 (2012) (detailing
the connection between President Johnson’s War on Poverty and self-determination policy);
Washburn, supra note 31, at 779 (“Scholars generally agree that the era of tribal selfdetermination began to form as early as the administration of President John F. Kennedy, and was
formalized, at least in the Executive Branch, with Richard Nixon’s significant 1970 statement on
federal Indian policy.”).
316. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat.
2203 (1975) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 450).
317. See Washburn, supra note 31, at 779.
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specific performance standards and record-keeping requirements
imposed by law and federal regulations.”318
Congress broadened self-determination policy in the Tribal SelfGovernance Act of 1994319 by “provid[ing] for an initial
foundational agreement between a tribe and a federal agency, after
which federal controls are diminished and the tribe assumes primacy
over the program.”320 Instead of entering into separate contracts for
each delegated function, the 1994 Act “allowed tribes to negotiate
broad compacts with the Department of the Interior,” provided block
grants covering a range of services, and gave tribes “discretion as to
how to allocate those federal funds.”321
That trend has continued.322 Under the Indian Tribal Energy
Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005,323 for example,
once a tribe enters into an agreement with the Department of the
Interior, it can manage the development of certain tribal natural
resources with little federal involvement.324 The National Park
318. Id.
319. Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 4270 (1994)
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 450a note, 458aa).
320. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Indian Gaming and Cooperative Federalism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
253, 286 (2010); see also id. at 282 (referring to the current period of federal Indian policy as the
“Self-Governance Era”).
321. Washburn, supra note 31, at 780. Congress also acted to preserve tribal cultures. See,
e.g., Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (2006) (“[I]t is the policy of this Nation to
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes.”); American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (2006) (“[I]t shall be the
policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of
freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions.”); Native American Languages
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006) (“[T]he United States has the responsibility . . . to ensure the
survival of these unique cultures and languages.”); Native American Graves and Repatriation Act,
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001, 3010 (2006) (“This chapter reflects the unique relationship between the
Federal Government and Indian tribes . . . and should not be construed to establish a precedent
with respect to any other individual.”); Indian Tribal Justice Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006) (“The
Congress finds and declares that—(1) there is a government-to-government relationship between
the United States and each Indian tribe; (2) the United States has a trust responsibility to each
tribal government that includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal government; . . .
(7) traditional tribal justice practices are essential to the maintenance of the culture and identity of
Indian tribes and to the goals of this chapter.”).
322. But see Washburn, supra note 31, at 781 & n.27 (opining that the last “significant” selfdetermination enactment was the American Housing and Self-Determination Act of 1996).
323. 25 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006).
324. See Skibine, supra note 320, at 286. Professor Skibine likened this statutory scheme to
cooperative federalism under the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Safe Drinking Water Act.
Id. at 287. From 1986 to 1990, Congress amended those statutes to authorize the EPA to treat
tribes the same as states for purposes of regulating the environment in areas under their
jurisdiction. Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-11, 7601(d)). See generally
Jessica Owley, Tribal Sovereignty over Water Quality, 20 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 61, 76–84

Fall 2013]

EAGLES & INDIAN TRIBES

101

Service recently proposed that Congress designate the South Unit of
Badlands National Park, which is on the Pine Ridge Indian
Reservation, as the first “tribal national park.”325 Under this proposal,
the Oglala Sioux Tribe would manage the South Unit pursuant to
both tribal and federal law.326 Similarly, the FWS has proposed
turning over the day-to-day management of the National Bison
Range in Montana, formerly part of the Flathead Reservation, to the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, though FWS would retain
oversight by a federal refuge manager.327
Academics generally endorse these developments. Dean Kevin
Washburn, now serving as Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs at
the Department of the Interior, observed that “the existing tribal selfdetermination initiatives are widely believed successful, and it is
difficult to find criticism of them in any literature.”328
Scholars focus now on expanding these self-determination
initiatives into more meaningful self-governance and tribal
sovereignty. Most scholars agree that genuine self-determination
requires something more than federal policy has provided. Rather
than try to describe the full scope of that scholarship, I highlight here
a few recent articles that give some context to my proposal.
Washburn, for example, argued that self-determination “must denote
the ability of an Indian tribe to ‘determine’ its identity, or in other
words, to create its own identity through defining and affirming its
(2004) (describing tribal “treatment as state” provision in the Clean Water Act). These provisions
are not directly analogous to my proposal because, although they reflect some respect for tribal
sovereignty, they do not recognize any special tribal interest in a resource, much less give tribes
authority to design the regulatory structure.
325. See South Unit General Management Plan, Record of Decision Signed, NATIONAL PARK
SERVICE (June 7, 2012), available at http://www.nps.gov/badl/parknews/south-unit-generalmanagement-plan-record-of-decision-signed.htm; see also South Unit Badlands National Park,
Final General Management Plan & Environmental Impact Statement, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
38 (Apr. 2012), available at http://parkplanning.nps.gov/document.cfm?parkID=117&projectID
=17543&documentID=47117 (announcing the General Management Plan and Environmental
Impact Statement, prepared by the National Park Service in conjunction with the Oglala Sioux
Tribe).
326. South Unit Badlands National Park, Final General Management Plan & Environmental
Impact Statement, supra note 325, at 39.
327. Emily Yehle, FWS's Plan to Share Management of Bison Refuge with Tribes Sparks
Lawsuit, EENEWS.NET (May 22, 2012), http://www.eenews.net/public/Greenwire/2012/05/22/9.
328. Washburn, supra note 31, at 781; see also id. at 781 n.28 (citing sources); id. at 779–80
(“Although neither BIA officials nor tribes were particularly happy with the implementation of
the 638 contracts program, the contracting of functions on Indian reservations by Indian tribes
was widely hailed as an improvement in federal Indian policy and a meaningful step toward selfdetermination.”).
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cultural values.”329 As a practical matter, Washburn posited that
tribal self-determination might require tribes to be able “to determine
[their] own governmental structure and implement the policies that
will effectuate [their] broader tribal values.”330 Federal selfdetermination programs by and large have delegated federal
programs and funds to tribes, but retained control at the federal
level.331 “While these efforts have been enormously positive,”
Washburn opined, they were “to some degree, low-hanging fruit that
was easily plucked from the tree.”332 To achieve “real selfdetermination,” Washburn endorsed giving tribes the authority to
define felonies under their own criminal laws.333
Hope Babcock drew on civic republican theory to provide a
foundation for returning greater sovereignty to tribes.334 Not unlike
Washburn, she wrote that giving tribes “undiminished authority to
determine their own lives . . . is an essential aspect of
sovereignty.”335 Federalism-inspired approaches that share
governmental power with tribes fall short, Professor Babcock said,
because they do not address the federal government’s selfproclaimed power to preempt tribal law—a power that she asserted is
inherently inconsistent with true tribal sovereignty.336 Instead, she
329. Id. at 782.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 786.
332. Id.
333. Id. Matthew Fletcher promoted agreements between tribes and state or local
governments concerning services, economic development, and shared resources as a means of
expanding tribal self-governance “while meeting the needs of non-Indian governments that are
frustrated by the limited application of state law in Indian country.” Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 FED. LAW. 38, 38 (2006). Similarly, Kevin
Gover advocated negotiated agreements between tribes and the Department of the Interior “to
apportion responsibilities for the management of Indian trust lands between the Department and
the Tribe.” Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J.
317, 319 (2006).
334. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision, supra note 31, at 446.
335. Id. at 454.
336. Id. at 501, 557; see also Gover, supra note 333, at 340 (“The doctrine of federal plenary
power, as scholar P.S. Deloria regularly points out, makes it possible for Congress and the courts
to do away with tribal government in an afternoon, should they choose to do so.”). William
Bradford agreed that the federal government’s plenary power over tribes must “be authoritatively
withdrawn.” Bradford, supra note 129, at 98. He proposed a model for making reparations for the
harm the federal government has caused Indians that would restore both ancestral lands and
“meaningful self-determination” to tribes to the greatest extent possible. Id. at 84, 89, 91.
Bradford’s model would give tribes “near-absolute territorial autonomy . . . in respect to all issue
areas” except commerce, foreign relations, and defense, a change that Bradford recognized might
require a constitutional amendment. Id. at 93, 98.
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advocated allowing tribes to opt out of federal laws that undermine
their sovereignty and threaten their very existence.337
Rebecca Tsosie, in analyzing the extent to which U.S. Indian
policy meets the aspirations of the United Nations’ Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,338 broke down the right to selfdetermination into four models, all of which play some role in
federal Indian policy. First, the “indigenous sovereignty” model
recognizes tribes’ inherent authority as separate governments “to
make [their] own laws and apply them within a defined territory.”339
Professor Tsosie explained that federal Indian policy adheres to this
model not only insofar as it protects tribes’ rights to govern their own
territories and members, but also in that it delegates to tribes federal
powers that may be delegated only to governmental entities, such as
the authority to act as a state under the Clean Air Act.340 Second,
under the “self-management” model, federal agencies authorize
tribes to operate federally designed and funded programs. The
contracting program under the Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975 typifies this model.341 Third, the
“co-management” model facilitates tribal “access and control of
lands that are currently outside their jurisdiction,”342 such as the
FWS proposal for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribes to
manage the National Bison Range. Fourth, the “participatory
governance” model “advocates the full participation of indigenous
peoples within the dominant society’s political system,” a model
reflected in the 1924 Act that gave federal citizenship to Indians.343
Professor Tsosie concluded, along the same lines as Hope Babcock,
that the federal government’s self-proclaimed power to “divest a
tribal government of its sovereign powers without its consent” is
inconsistent with international human rights law.344 Ultimately, she
337. Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision, supra note 31, at 559, 564.
338. Tsosie, supra note 31, at 925.
339. Id. at 930. Tsosie’s argument expanded well beyond federally recognized Indian tribes.
She argued that all indigenous peoples are entitled to self-determination under the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Id. at 941.
340. Id. at 930–31 & nn.55–56.
341. Id. at 931; see also Judith Rae, Program Delivery Devolution: A Stepping Stone or
Quagmire for First Nations, 7 INDIGENOUS L.J. 1, 6–9 (2008) (distinguishing self-administration
and self-government).
342. Tsosie, supra note 31, at 932.
343. Id. at 933.
344. Id. at 941. Tsosie also argues that federal abrogation of Indian treaties violates the U.N.
Declaration’s “emphasis upon the need to negotiate a contemporary political relationship between
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applauded the Obama administration’s support of the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, but demonstrated
that U.S. domestic law has a long way to go to meet the normative
aspirations of that document.345
Empowering tribes to allocate the eagle resource is consistent
with the trend of allowing tribal governments greater control over
resources. The first stage of my proposal, issuing Eagle Act permits
to tribes instead of individual tribal members, is the sort of “lowhanging fruit”346 that could have been plucked years ago. That
regulatory change would merely delegate part of a federal program to
recognized tribes, while retaining control at the federal level, and
thus extends no further than current law and policy.
The second stage of my proposal, turning over more of the
actual definition and administration of the Indian tribes exception to
the tribes acting collectively, is in line with academic calls for greater
tribal self-determination. Empowering tribes to define the contours
of the Indian tribes exception—including, perhaps, defining who is
entitled to take and possess eagles and for what purposes, how they
may be obtained, transferred, and disposed, and how permits should
be allocated—would allow tribes, in Washburn’s words, to determine
their own identities by implementing policies that reflect tribal
values.347 In Rebecca Tsosie’s scheme, the second stage of my
proposal goes beyond the “self-management” model insofar as it
does not just delegate the authority to administer a federally designed
program, but gives tribes some, albeit limited, power to design the
law itself.348
The second stage of my proposal is also relatively low-hanging
fruit insofar as it does not interfere with any settled expectations of
non-Indians or with state authority. It certainly does not go so far as
Professor Tsosie’s “indigenous sovereignty” model and allow tribes
to make and apply their own law within their own territory.349 In that
indigenous peoples and the nation-state that is founded upon respect, trust, and political equality.”
Id. at 943.
345. Id. at 924–25.
346. See Washburn, supra note 31, at 786.
347. See id. at 782.
348. See Tsosie, supra note 31, at 931.
349. See id. at 930. My proposal also fails to satisfy Professor Tsosie’s call for enhancing the
self-determination of indigenous groups that are not federally recognized. See id. at 941.
Expanding access to nonmembers would be problematic for the reasons explained in the text
accompanying notes 349–55.
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sense, my proposal falls far short of scholarly calls for more genuine
self-determination. For example, the Eagle Act probably falls within
the scope of laws from which Hope Babcock believes tribes should
be able to exempt themselves because it “touches matters at the core
of the individual or collective identities of Aboriginal peoples as
tribal Indians” and concerns a “fundamental collective right.”350
Several factors preclude returning full tribal sovereignty over eagles:
the biology of the species necessitates oversight by biological experts
at the regional and national level; the bald eagle is not just a tribal
resource, but our national symbol; states traditionally have regulated
wildlife and would balk at any infringement of this authority; and
eliminating FWS oversight would necessitate amending the Eagle
Act. I hope that part of my proposal’s appeal is that it is a realistic
means of returning some control over a resource that is vital to the
identity of many tribes to the tribes themselves.
B. Benefits
Shifting from permitting individual tribal members to permitting
tribes would have several advantages. It would alleviate some of the
inequitable tension of the current regulatory scheme, as well as some
of the burden that scheme imposes on tribal members. It would also
yield benefits for the federal government’s implementation of the
Eagle Act, and it could channel the courts of appeals toward a more
unified approach in Eagle Act cases.
1. Easing Inequality
The Indian tribes exception can be seen primarily as either a
religious accommodation or a political accommodation, and the
interest it creates can be seen as inuring to the benefit of either
individual tribal members or the tribes themselves. I believe the
350. See Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision, supra note 31, at 561, 564. In the Eagle Act
context, however, my suggestion that the FWS retain the authority to oversee the viability of the
nation’s eagle populations is not entirely inconsistent with Babcock’s thesis. In situations where
exempting themselves from a federal law would cause “undesired spillover impacts on adjacent
communities,” Babcock expected that tribes would “learn to adjust [their] activities so that they
are not harmful to residents of neighboring states.” Id. at 566. This concept seems to rely on the
availability of federal judicial review to adjudicate competing interests. See id. at 566 n.553.
Thus, Babcock agrees that some overriding federal standard might survive in contexts such as
this. Moreover, the availability of federal judicial review is severely curtailed in the Eagle Act
context because the Eagle Act does not provide a private right of action. See Defenders of
Wildlife v. Adm’r, E.P.A., 882 F.2d 1294, 1301 (8th Cir. 1989).
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better view takes the Indian tribes exception as primarily a political
accommodation for Indian tribes. Essentially, I advocate treating
tribal use of eagle feathers not as a religious issue, but as a political
and property-based issue. Implementing the Eagle Act in accordance
with that view and issuing permits to tribes instead of individual
tribal members would alleviate, though not eliminate, some of the
inequitable tension the government’s current implementation of the
Eagle Act creates.351
Viewing the Indian tribes exception as primarily a political
accommodation for tribes is consistent with Congress’s intent and
the plain language of the Eagle Act, as well as with historic practice.
Treaties with numerous Indian tribes guaranteed them exclusive
rights to hunt and fish on their lands.352 Those treaty rights generally
inured to the benefit of tribes, not individuals.353 The Eagle Act
abrogated those treaty rights with respect to eagles.354 In the 1962
amendment to the Eagle Act, Congress restored some of those preexisting treaty rights through the Indian tribes exception. As the
Supreme Court observed in Dion, Congress replaced the treaty
regime “in which Indian on-reservation hunting was unrestricted”
with “a regime in which the Secretary of the Interior had control over
Indian hunting.”355 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Indian tribes exception serves the United States’ interest in fulfilling
its treaty commitments to federally recognized Indian tribes.356

351. As explained above, I believe the inequality between tribal members and nonmembers
with the same religious needs is both necessary and justifiable. See supra text accompanying note
187.
352. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986); Menominee Tribe of Indians v.
United States, 391 U.S. 404, 405–06 (1968); see also, e.g., Treaty with the Flatheads, 12 Stat. 975
(1855); Treaty with the Nez Perce, 12 Stat. 957 (1855); Treaty with the Yakima, 12 Stat. 951
(1855); Treaty with the Tribes of Middle Oregon, 12 Stat. 963 (1855); Treaty with the Chippewa,
7 Stat. 536 (1837); Treaty of Fort Laramie with the Sioux, etc., 11 Stat. 749 (1851).
353. See Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he very great
majority of Indian treaties create tribal, not individual rights.” (internal quotes omitted)); Wood,
supra note 276, at 33, 35–36 (discussing treaty fishing rights).
354. Dion, 476 U.S. at 745.
355. Dion, 476 U.S. at 743; see also Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1360 (S.D. Fla.
1999) (“[B]y providing bald and golden eagle parts to federally recognized Indian tribes, the
United States—albeit in a substituted fashion—is fulfilling a pre-existing treaty obligation to the
tribes.”).
356. Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1258 (per curiam). Scholars have justifiably criticized the
administrative process through which the Department of the Interior determines which groups are
entitled to federal acknowledgment. See, e.g., Tsosie, supra note 31, at 939–40.
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That Congress intended the Indian tribes exception to be an
accommodation for tribes is reflected in its decision to exempt
“Indian tribes,” not “Indians.”357 “It is an elementary rule of
construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word,
clause and sentence of a statute.”358 If Congress had intended to
accommodate the religious needs of individual Indians, it could have
drafted an exception to accomplish that purpose.359 Congress should
not be presumed to have intended a different result.360 Thus, the plain
language of the Indian tribes exception indicates that it was intended
to be primarily an accommodation for tribes.
Moreover, that intent is consistent with the federal government’s
traditional practice of interacting with Indian tribes as sovereigns
rather than with individual members of tribes. Although some federal
statutes provide benefits to individual tribal members, “the United
States always treated Indian affairs as a relationship between the
federal government and Indian tribes, not as a race-based relationship
involving Indians.”361 Thus, the Indian tribes exception is best seen
as primarily a political—not religious—accommodation for tribes
and not for individuals.

357. See Carpenter, Limiting Principles, supra note 128, at 437 (“Congress explicitly
referenced the rights of tribes as an aspect of its interest in accommodating Indian religious
freedoms.”).
358. 2A Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 46:6 (7th ed. 2011) (quotation marks omitted); see also United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39 (1955) (“It is our duty ‘to give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute.’”).
359. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1934) (defining “Indian” in Indian Reorganization Act to
include “all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood”).
360. See, e.g., Ransom v. FIA Card Services, N.A., 131 S. Ct. 716, 724 (2011) (observing that
Congress’s intent presumably is reflected in the words it chooses to use in a statute).
361. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Original Understanding of the Political Status of Indian
Tribes, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 153, 156 (2008). Professor Fletcher demonstrates that both before
and after the Constitution was ratified, “the federal government . . . engage[d] in Indian affairs by
dealing solely with Indian tribes and not individual Indians.” Id. at 172; see also id. at 170 (“The
Executive branch continued engaging in treaty-making with Indian tribes, as opposed to seeking
opportunities to purchase lands from individual Indian landholders.”). That practice continued
through the adoption of the Reconstruction Amendments. Id. at 176. Sarah Krakoff explains that
“[t]he political and the racial are therefore hopelessly intermingled in current legal definitions of
tribes.” Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal Sovereignty, 87
WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2012). Thus, while the category “federally recognized Indian tribe”
is certainly political, it also reflects the “racialized history” of the federal government’s
relationship with Indians. Id. at 1132. Krakoff urges courts not to try to untangle the racial and
political in Indian affairs because doing so is “more likely to entrench historical discrimination
against indigenous peoples than to reverse it.” Id.
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Singling out federally recognized Indian tribes for special
treatment is constitutionally permissible. In Morton v. Mancari,362
the Supreme Court upheld a Bureau of Indian Affairs hiring
preference for members of federally recognized Indian tribes,363 and
reiterated that federally recognized Indian tribes have a “unique legal
status” affording Congress “plenary power . . . to legislate on [their]
behalf.”364 The government’s authority to enact legislation
specifically benefiting tribes, the Court held,365 is drawn from the
Indian Commerce Clause366 and the President’s treaty power.367 The
Supreme Court reaffirmed more recently that “Congress may fulfill
its treaty obligations and its responsibilities to the Indian tribes by
enacting legislation dedicated to their circumstances and needs.”368
Professor Worthen went a step further and concluded that because,
among other things, tribes have a unique legal status and the United
States has traditionally interacted with tribes, not individual Indians,
the Eagle Act’s preferential treatment of Indian tribes is normatively
acceptable.369
Even if we recognize that the Indian tribes exception is primarily
a political accommodation, however, it obviously has a religious
component insofar as it exempts only the “religious purposes” of
Indian tribes. Since both the purpose and effect of the exception are
primarily secular, however, that religious component introduces no
constitutional infirmity. The Supreme Court has invalidated statutes
for being insufficiently secular only when religion provided the
primary purpose or constituted the principal effect of the
enactment.370 Accordingly, the First Circuit appropriately relied on

362. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
363. See id. at 553 n.24.
364. Id. at 551, 553.
365. Id. at 551–52.
366. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
367. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
368. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 519 (2000).
369. Worthen, supra note 23, at 993, 1009, 1014–15.
370. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864–65 (2005); Hernandez v. Comm’r,
490 U.S. 680, 696 (1989) (“[A] statute primarily having a secular effect does not violate the
Establishment Clause merely because it ‘happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of
some or all religions.’” (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 422 (1961)); Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (“[N]ot every law that confers an indirect, remote, or
incidental benefit upon [religion] is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid.” (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Comm. for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 771 (1973))).
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Morton v. Mancari to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to the
Eagle Act.371
Viewing the Indian tribes exception as primarily a religious
accommodation, on the other hand, would introduce a problem.
Congress may accommodate particular religious needs without
running afoul of the Constitution. The Supreme Court “has long
recognized that the government may . . . accommodate religious
practices . . . without violating the Establishment Clause.”372
Preferences that are intended to “alleviate significant governmental
interference” with the exercise of religion are constitutionally
permissible.373 As Michael McConnell explained, a “legitimate
accommodation . . . merely removes obstacles to the exercise of a
religious conviction adopted for reasons independent of the
government’s action.”374 Accommodating religious groups instead of
individuals is also permissible.375 Indeed, in a seminal religious
accommodation case, the Supreme Court upheld Title VII’s
provision exempting religious organizations from the prohibition
against employment discrimination based on religion.376 The Court
371. Rupert v. Dir., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32, 34–35 (1st Cir. 1992); see also
Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1216–17 (5th Cir. 1991)
(holding state law that prohibited peyote use except by members of recognized tribes did not
violate the Establishment Clause).
372. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment
Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987)).
373. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987).
374. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992); see also Zoe Robinson, Rationalizing Religious
Exemptions: A Legislative Process Theory of Statutory Exemptions for Religion, 20 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 133 (2011) (applying a public choice model to conclude that statutory
religious accommodations are animated by legislators’ self-interests and hence favor majoritarian
interests). But see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1007, 1016 (2001) (arguing that McConnell’s view is erroneous because “the
Establishment Clause . . . prohibit[s] the government from preferring religion to nonreligion for
two basic reasons: to protect against government preference among religions and to recognize the
importance of both religious and nonreligious values in a modern, pluralistic society”).
375. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 706 (2012)
(“[T]he text of the First Amendment itself . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations” and “protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission.”); id. at
700, 705, 710 (holding the judicially created “ministerial exception,” which “precludes
application of [employment discrimination laws] to claims concerning the employment
relationship between a religious institution and its ministers,” barred the Americans with
Disabilities Act claim of a “called” teacher at a religious school). But cf. Leslie Griffin, The Sins
of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L.J. 981, 981 (2013) (criticizing Hosanna-Tabor for, inter alia,
favoring religious institutions over individuals).
376. Amos, 483 U.S. at 330.
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held that “it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate
significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.”377
The problem with viewing the Indian tribes exception as
primarily a religious accommodation, however, is that the
government cannot favor one religion over others.378 If the Indian
tribes exception is primarily a religious accommodation, then the
government must extend that accommodation to similarly situated
religious groups,379 including the one million practitioners of AfroCaribbean religions that require eagles.380 Opening up the Indian
tribes exception to people who are not members of federally
recognized Indian tribes would increase wait times at the
Repository.381 As Judge Kozinski explained, “If the government
extended eligibility, every permit issued to a nonmember would be
one fewer issued to a member. This is the inescapable result of a
demand that exceeds a fixed supply.”382 The Repository already
cannot meet the current demand.383 Increasing the number of eligible
applicants would thus vitiate the government’s efforts to satisfy the
needs of recognized tribes.384 Increased delays would be particularly
problematic for theocratic tribes, like the Zuni, in which “all aspects
of tribal life—including governance, social structures, justice
systems, and culture—are infused with religious meaning.”385
Issuing permits to tribes instead of individual tribal members
would make what currently appears to be a religious exception for
certain individuals look more like the primarily political
377. Id. at 335.
378. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982); see also Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709,
720 (2005) (holding statutory test identical to RFRA must be “administered neutrally among
different faiths”).
379. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. School Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706–07
(1994) (holding a statute creating a special school district using the lines for a village enclave of a
particular form of Judaism violated the Establishment Clause); see also Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533–36 (1993) (holding an animal cruelty
ordinance that accommodated kosher slaughter, but not Santerian sacrifice, violated the Free
Exercise Clause).
380. See supra Part II.A.
381. See Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States
v. Wilgus, 638 F.3d 1274, 1293 (10th Cir. 2011).
382. United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 2003).
383. Frosch, supra note 157 (explaining that “with 4,500 requests each year, the repository
simply does not have enough eagles”).
384. Gibson, 223 F.3d at 1258; Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1293 & n.9.
385. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 799, 845 (2007).
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accommodation it was originally intended to be. It would no longer
pit individual religious practitioners against other individual religious
practitioners. Rather, it would pit individual religious practitioners
against sovereign nations with whom the United States has a
government-to-government relationship, thus alleviating, though
certainly not abrogating, the inequitable tension in the Eagle Act case
law.
2. Alleviating Burdens
Granting permits to Indian tribes would alleviate some of the
burden the permit process currently imposes on tribal religious
practitioners. Implementing the first phase of my proposal would
necessarily require tribes to develop administrative structures to
distribute their share of the feathers or take permits, as the Hopi have
already done. While this might not be an easy task for some tribes, it
would give tribes an opportunity to tailor their regulatory
requirements to their members’ needs and sensitivities, making the
program “a closer cultural match.”386 For example, tribes might opt
not to operate on a first-come, first-served basis, but instead to
prioritize certain religious needs. Tribal members might still have to
fill out application forms and wait for their requests to be filled, but
at least they would not be making a personal, religious request to a
federal agency. Rather, they would be making requests to people
who share their culture. Hopefully, administering eagle permits at the
tribal level will enhance tribal members’ sense of ownership in the
program and result in a more effective regulatory program.387
Turning the distribution of the eagle resource over to tribes
would also remove the discomfort of empowering a federal agency to
assess the bona fides of applicants’ religious beliefs. Tribal
governments would be free to evaluate applicants’ sincerity and the
validity of their religious tenets, so long as their organic laws do not
forbid it.388
386. Rae, supra note 341, at 18; see also Gover, supra note 333, at 320 (“The diversity of
tribal circumstances requires a policy that is sufficiently flexible to meet the diverse conditions
and capabilities of the Tribes.”); id. at 359–60 (discussing the necessity of a customized trust
administration).
387. Rae, supra note 341, at 19 (discussing empirical studies demonstrating that “selfadministered programs are more likely to succeed in generating the desired outcomes of the
program”).
388. See generally Carpenter, Religious Freedoms, supra note 128 (arguing that tribes can
protect individual religious freedoms in ways that reflect tribal norms and enhance sovereignty).
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The second phase of my proposal would provide an opportunity
to further alleviate the regulatory scheme’s burdens on tribes. For
example, the tribes acting collectively could decide to allow tribal
members to keep eagles they find instead of requiring them to turn
those birds in to the Repository. They might decide to take over the
operation of the Repository or replace the Repository with some
other distributional mechanism.
3. Enhancing Regulatory Efficiency and Judicial Uniformity
The long-term benefits of this regulatory change would justify
the short-term burden on tribes and the FWS. The burden of
implementing the Eagle Act permit system should be alleviated by
cutting the number of potential applicants from over two million
members of federally recognized tribes to only 566 tribal
governments. Although the FWS has not received many requests for
eagle take permits, it should be easier to protect the species’ viability
if take permits are aggregated at the tribal level, rather than issued to
individuals.
Moreover, tribes that wish to participate in the eagle permitting
system could be encouraged or required to develop tribal game
codes, if they do not already exist. Those tribal codes could enhance
federal law enforcement by making Lacey Act charges a viable
alternative to the Eagle Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.389
Tribal law-enforcement capacity might grow, too, and provide even
more assistance to federal enforcement officers than tribal authorities
currently do. Ultimately, tribes might operate the Repository and
take on the task of determining among themselves how to allocate
the eagle resource with federal oversight to ensure species health. In
short, enhanced tribal wildlife governance structures will supplement
federal administration and could free up federal resources for other
important wildlife priorities.
Finally, directing the regulatory structure to tribes instead of
individual tribal members could bring more uniformity to the case
law. Refocusing the Indian tribes exception as a political
Indian tribes are not subject to the U.S. Constitution. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896);
Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (10th
Cir. 1959). Also, the Indian Civil Rights Act does not contain an Establishment Clause analog.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (2010).
389. See 16 U.S.C. § 3372 (2013).
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accommodation would highlight its role in fulfilling the
government’s trust and treaty obligations toward recognized tribes,
making it more likely that the courts would recognize that as a
compelling interest underlying the exception. This regulatory change
also might alleviate some of the concern with inequity that may have
inspired the Tenth Circuit in Hardman to impose a daunting
evidentiary burden on the government. Instead, the courts of appeals,
seeing eagles as a tribal property interest, might be more inclined
toward the Ninth Circuit’s recognition in Antoine that RFRA does
not authorize shifting burdens from one person onto others.390
Similarly, this change would further distance the Eagle Act from O
Centro’s concern about singling out particular religious claimants for
special treatment.391
C. Implementation
Designing a new regulatory system would require the
knowledge, experience, and expertise of the FWS’s biologists and
law enforcement officers, as well as tribal government
representatives. No doubt, the logistics would be challenging.
However, the system is not sustainable in the long-term as it is
currently structured. The tensions the Eagle Act creates, as currently
administered, threaten to pull the entire scheme apart. Without a
viable regulatory system that protects eagles and accommodates
tribal religion, neither will survive.
Some questions will need to be answered in developing a new
regulatory system.392 At the first stage of my proposal, amending the
Eagle Act regulations to provide for issuing permits to tribes instead
of individual tribal members, the stakeholders will have to determine
how to allocate the eagle resource initially among federally
recognized tribes and what to do with people who already are on the
National Eagle Repository’s waiting list.393 One option is to allocate

390. See supra Part III.C.
391. See supra Part III.B.
392. The FWS could consider using a negotiated rulemaking process. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–70
(2013); see generally Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate)
Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987 (2008) (discussing the process and
benefits of negotiated rulemaking).
393. To the extent that individuals on the waiting list have a vested interest in receiving
feathers from the Repository that tribal governments may not compromise, the FWS may need to
honor those pending requests to avoid unlawful retroactivity. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
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permits initially based on historic demand. For what are currently
known as possession permits—that is, applications to receive eagles
and eagle parts from the Repository—the number of applications
members of each tribe have filed in the past, including applications
that are already pending at the Repository, could be used to
determine the initial allocation of tribal permits, and the burden
could be placed on the tribes to justify a different allocation. As
explained above,394 Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s theory of
indigenous cultural property posits that “some cultural resources are
so sacred and intimately connected to a people’s collective identity
and experience that they deserve special consideration as a form of
cultural property.”395 The new regulatory scheme could be built on
the presumption that, if eagles are integral to a particular tribe’s
identity, members of that tribe will have applied for parts from the
Repository in the past, as the Repository is the only legal source for
new eagles and feathers. There may be many reasons, however, why
a particular tribe’s members did not apply to the Repository; perhaps
the long wait or the quality of the feathers would not have satisfied
those individuals’ religious needs. Thus, allocating possession
permits to tribes is not so simple as counting past applications.
The allocation of permits to take live eagles would be even more
complex because historic demand cannot be determined based solely
on federal permit applications. Before the Tenth Circuit decided
United States v. Friday in 2008, the FWS had issued only a handful
of permits to take golden eagles because the availability of take
permits was not widely known.396 Nonetheless, tribes whose
members have applied for take permits in the past could be given
priority in the initial allocation of tribal take permits because their
past applications demonstrate that taking live eagles is integral to the
tribe’s identity. An added complication for eagle take permits is the
geographic element. Unlike dead eagles and their parts, which can be
distributed nationwide, populations of live eagles that are healthy
enough to withstand permitted takes are concentrated in certain
areas. For example, when the FWS issued a take permit to the
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204 (1988); Nat’l Mining Assoc. v. Dept. of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 859 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
394. See text accompanying notes 266-274.
395. Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1028.
396. United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 945 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The permit process is used
infrequently, and is not widely known.”).
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Chairman of the Northern Arapaho Tribe’s Business Council, it
specified that the eagles could not be taken on the Tribe’s
reservation.397
Issuing Eagle Act permits to tribes will also necessitate
identifying which tribal entity will apply for the permit and distribute
the tribe’s share of eagles among its members. The tribes should be
given an adequate amount of time and support, both technical and
financial, to develop the required administrative structures, but the
tribes themselves should decide how to accomplish these tasks.
Giving the tribes that responsibility, however, raises another
significant question that the stakeholders designing the new
regulatory system will have to answer: What happens when a
particular tribe is not up to the task? Should the Department of the
Interior administer the Eagle Act permit program for it?
At the second stage of my proposal, when a sufficient number of
tribes have developed the governance structures necessary to
administer the permit system, the tribes acting collectively could be
empowered to, among other things, define who is entitled to take and
possess eagles and for what purposes, how they may be obtained,
transferred, and disposed, and how the initial allocation of permits
should be changed. In the language of Carpenter, Katyal, and Riley’s
cultural property theory, the tribes would be enabled to define the
parameters of the stewardship regime for eagles.398 Similarly, Kristen
Johnson’s and Sheila Foster’s community governance models
suggest that the tribes would create and manage an institution for
administering the Indian tribes exception, overseen by the FWS.399
397. See Judge Rules Against Tribe in Bald Eagle Case, EENEWS.NET, (Nov. 7, 2012), http://
www.eenews.net/Greenwire/print/2012/11/07/18; Ben Neary, Northern Arapaho Tribe: Bald
Eagle Permit a Victory for Tradition, HUFFINGTON POST, (Mar. 17, 2012, 10:20 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/17/northern-arapaho-tribe-bald-eagle_n_1355335.html;
Northern Arapaho Tribe Labels Federal Eagle Permit a Sham, INDIANZ.COM, (Apr. 5, 2012),
http://64.38.12.138/News/2012/005200.asp.
398. See Carpenter et al., supra note 29, at 1086.
399. See Johnson, supra note 30, at 244; Foster, supra note 30, at 88–91. Elinor Ostrom
concluded that self-governing common-pool resource management systems that have endured
over time share certain characteristics: they have “clearly defined boundaries”; the rules
governing appropriation and provision of the resource are tailored to local conditions; resource
users who are affected by the rules can participate in modifying them; the system includes
effective monitoring, graduated sanctions, and conflict-resolution mechanisms; the government
recognizes the right of resource users to establish the rules for the resource; and all of these
features “are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises.” OSTROM, supra note 30, at 90–
102. The stakeholders should pay attention to these factors in fleshing out the details of my
proposal.
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As Indian-law scholars urge, this stage of my proposal would go part
of the way toward recognizing tribes’ inherent sovereign right to
manage a resource that is central to the cultural identity of many
tribes.400 Given the great variation in tribal religious practices, the
tribes acting collectively might decide to leave many of these
decisions to individual tribes or to the FWS.401 Ultimately, however,
that is a decision the tribes themselves should make.
V. CONCLUSION
The imbalance between the supply and the religious demand for
eagles is growing and may soon reach a breaking point. The system
must change if eagles and tribal religion are to survive. This Article
proposes to pick some “low-hanging fruit” by amending the FWS
regulations to issue Eagle Act take and possession permits to
federally recognized Indian tribes instead of to individual tribal
members, and eventually to go further and enable the tribes
themselves to define the contours of the Indian tribes exception.
These changes will alleviate much of the tension in the current
regulatory scheme and yield benefits for tribes, for the federal
government, and for eagles. It is my sincere hope that this Article
will spur further discussion and lead to lasting, positive change.

400. See, e.g., Washburn, supra note 31, at 782.
401. Cf. Gover, supra note 333, at 333 (emphasizing that, given tribal wariness of efforts to
reduce federal responsibility for trust resources, “[t]he challenge for current policy makers is to
find a formula that leaves the tribes feeling secure in the federal-tribal relationship even as the
federal role is reduced and tribal self-governance strengthened”).
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